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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Application of Risk-Based Decision Making on
Planning VTS

Degree:

MSc

The dissertation is a study of the methodologies of applying risk-based decisionmaking (RBDM) on planning VTS, under the framework of Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA) recommended by IMO.
The concept of safety and risk as well as their relationship is introduced and
discussed. A brief look is taken at the traditional and risk-based approaches to
decision-making in terms of their concepts, principles, and comparison so that the
advantages and necessity of RBDM to maritime safety are highlighted. With the
presentation of the concept and principle of VTS, the significance of FSA on
planning VTS is specified. The problem under analysis and its boundaries related to
planning VTS is defined and a model for identifying a list of risks and hazards with
associated scenarios, prioritized by risk level, is introduced. After some
recommended models were examined, new methods based on the risk index theory
are demonstrated in order to practically estimate the risk level and determine risk
acceptability for planning VTS. Then, for uncovering the underlying factors of traffic
accidents, the m-SHEL model and a new model based on the Reason model, which
are especially suitable for specifying the relevant risk control options in the context
of waterways management, are presented. The cost-benefit analysis for a
prioritisation of the risk control options is elaborated in order to determine whether to
implement the options. The dissertation concludes with an emphasis on the
importance of RBDM on planning VTS, and gives a number of suggestions aimed at
the further promotion of a proactive policy on planning VTS.
KEYWORDS: Safety, Risk Assessment, FSA, VTS, Decision-making
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Introduction
Due to the development of larger and less manoeuvrable ships, the increasing traffic
volume, dangerous cargoes and the potential for environmental pollution,
establishing a VTS to reduce these risks, as a valid measure, has been a practical
solution in many ports and waterways around the world. The number of VTS
systems worldwide has increased rapidly during the last two decades and there are
now about 500 of these services available in total. In particular, with the recent
booming seaborne trade and reinforced awareness of a friendly marine environment,
the implementation of new VTS and the re-assessment of an existing VTS worldwide
are reaching a new high tide. However, constructing a VTS is a considerable
investment and its subsequent operation is also very money-consuming.
Consequently, how to plan a VTS perfectly, which will result in fulfilling its
functions validly, contributing in reaching its purposes to the greatest extent as
envisaged, and establishing whether the investment required is justified, are key
considerations faced by each VTS stakeholder.
Risk-based decision-making (RBDM) has become a hot topic recently in industry
and government, and the maritime community is no exception. The need for RBDM
in maritime policy is obvious, as the resources that the public and private sectors can
devote to navigational safety, traffic efficiency and environmental protection are
finite. If these limited resources are spent dealing with low-risk problems at the
expense of high-risk ones, then the industry will be exposed to higher risks that
cannot be withstood due to an imbalance in resources distribution. The application of
RBDM in the maritime sector could remedy these situations. It provides a powerful
tool that can help ensure that limited public and private resources are allocated more

1

effectively to reducing risks, maximizing the protection of maritime safety and the
environment as well as increasing traffic efficiency.
The traditional approach to safety in the maritime sector has been reactive - to react
to problems as they occur. Instead of reacting in an ad hoc way to a problem, a
careful analysis of the risk situation should be carried out while keeping financial and
resource constraints in mind, which is of special importance to the concerned
stakeholders and decision-makers. So in order to lower risks rationally as much as
possible, it is suggested that when planning a VTS, decision-makers should use
proactive methods, which could be the application of the principle of risk-based
decision-making on maritime fields.
A practical framework recommended by IMO for RBDM on maritime fields is
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). This gives decision-makers a clearer insight into
the policy and a trustworthy platform on which they form policies and can assist
them to evaluate the rationality, necessity and cost-effectiveness of a marine project.
So it is very useful and significant to do the research concerning the application of
FSA, a framework of RBDM on the maritime sector, when planning for a VTS.
This dissertation outlines a process for developing an evaluation tool to be used as
the basis for a systematic approach for planning VTSs. The main issues are
illustrated through a detailed case study, the Wuhan Port in China, which
demonstrates the large range of an area that can be tackled successfully using several
newly introduced approaches in the framework of FSA. Thus, the objectives of this
paper are:
• To determine the factors to be taken into account when considering VTS and
identify the suitable currently used risk assessment and cost/benefit analysis methods
and models for planning VTS.
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• To provide decision-makers with useful tools and references for the planning of a
new VTS or the re-assessment of an existing VTS, for the purpose of achieving the
ultimate goals of marine safety and environmental protection as well as efficient
traffic.
• To develop comprehensive marine traffic risk assessment models in order to assess
the adequacy and efficiency of the existing mitigation and control systems, develop
supplementary measures to tackle the risks, if required, establish a basis for deciding
the implementation of measures which can reduce the risk in planned area, as well as
form a basis for prioritising the individual risk control options.
As a matter of fact, the work to identify, analyse and manage maritime risks for a
planned VTS area is generally vast, and it is not possible within such a short paper to
present all the necessary information in detail. However, the author tries to present a
quick and fresh look at maritime risks and the need for analysis with a focus on a
large area. The result of this study could be useful for those concerned with the
planning of large maritime projects or waterways management. In this sense, this
work could also be a complementary tool in developing a comprehensive, structured
and systematic decision-making process for the maritime field.
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CHAPTER 1
Risk-based Decision-making in Planning for a VTS
The purpose of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to improve the maritime safety and
efficiency of navigation, safety of life at sea and the protection of the marine
environment and/or the adjacent shore area, work sites and offshore installations
from the possible adverse effects of marine traffic in a given area (IALA, 2002). Its
performance regarding these aspects greatly depends on the rationality, justifiability
and cost-effectiveness related to planning such a large maritime project.
This chapter will introduce the basic concepts of safety and risk as well as their
relationship. The traditional approach to making decisions concerning maritime
safety will be re-examined, then the concept of risk-based decision-making will be
introduced and examined with the aim of identifying its advantages and necessity for
marine safety. Next, the concept and principle of VTS will be presented, and the
significance of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), a framework for RBDM
recommended by IMO, on planning VTS will be specified.
1.1 Safety and risk
Safety was not considered to be a matter of public concern in ancient times, when
accidents were regarded as inevitable or as the will of the gods. The modern notion
of safety was developed only in the 19th century as an outgrowth of the industrial
revolution, when a terrible toll from industrial accidents aroused humanitarian
concern for their prevention (Pillay & Wang, 2004). Today safety is of deep concern
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to the whole of human society and has become the province of the public and private
sectors.
The term “safety” is discussed widely in literature from different perspectives and its
definition is interpreted variously. For instance, safety is defined in the Concise
Oxford Dictionary, as “freedom from danger”, while Kuo C. (1998) interprets: safety
is “perceived quality that determines to what extent the management, engineering
and operation of a system is free of danger to life, property and the environment”.
Although safety has different definitions, a generally accepted view of safety could
thus be embodied from these definitions: absolute safety is not available and there is
always room for achieving more freedom from danger (Kuo, 1998).
Similarly, the term of risk is mentioned in different contexts, by different scholars,
and is defined in different literary expressions. For instance, the US
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management
(1997) defines risk as “the probability of a specific outcome, generally adverse,
given a particular set of conditions”; Warner (1992) proposes a definition with two
factors: “risk is a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a
defined hazard and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence” (Warner
1992 cited in Jones and Hood 1996).

No matter how risk is defined, there is a consensus in realistic society: zero risk does
not exist and what people can do is to reduce the risk to the level toward which they
can be satisfied. This level is related to human risk perceptions, which could vary
with different individuals, or different circumstances. For example, the public has
become accustomed to thousands of fatalities caused by car accidents annually,
however it cannot tolerate an incident such as the “Prestige” occurring again.
Having examined the meaning of safety and risk, the relation between them would be
easy to figure out. According to the definition of risk, people could show the extent,
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to which the system presents danger to life, property and the environment, by risk.
Consequently, safety could also be expressed by risk in the reverse direction: higher
risk, less safety; lower risk, more safety. Thus just like what could be drawn from the
popular definition of safety “safety is a state where the level of risk has been
reduced to a baseline of as low as reasonably practicable”, it is feasible and
reasonable to improve safety by controlling and reducing risks.
In addition, safety is an abstract term, while the term of risk is more concrete and can
be qualified and quantified by various means. It is therefore practical to represent
safety by means of risk and improve safety by managing risks (Xie, 2001).
1.2 Traditional approach to making decisions concerning maritime safety
Rob Dixon (2003) states in his book that “decision-making, which lies at the heart of
management, is a process of thought and action that leads to a decision”. Managers
spend their time choosing between alternative courses of action on the basis of the
information available to them at the time. Since the first wooden canoe of primitive
build challenged the vast oceans and seas, the marine industry has always been
regarded as a risky business, accordingly people have been struggling with
mitigation of marine risk and improving maritime safety constantly through history
in order to maintain and promote this indispensable industry to world trade, while
decision-makers have also been developing relevant marine policies to achieve the
above attempts.
The traditional approach to making decisions concerning marine safety is based on
“learning from experiences”, the essence of which is that what people learn and
accumulate from past experiences predominates over their decision-making process
and outcomes. It is a typically reactive method; Figure 1 illustrates the basic
principle of this approach.
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An old example of this approach is the Titanic incident: after this disastrous casualty
people realized the importance of sufficient lifesaving equipment and damage
stability, so that the decision to create a new Convention (SOLAS, 1914) was made.
A recent example is the introduction of double-hull tankers: people drew lessons
from severe oil pollution accidents such as the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989 and
the Prestige accident in 2002 etc. and stipulated marine policies to phase out singlehull tankers.

Fail

Do according
to experience

Succeed
Do according
to experience

Reinforce/confirm
old experience

Review

Draw lesson,
and change
New
experience

Successful mode

Failure mode

Figure 1: the basic principle of the traditional approach to decision-making
Source: Xie. (2001). Risk-based Approach to Maritime Safety. Unpublished master’s dissertation,
Malmö, Sweden: World Maritime University.

In the marine sector, people have identified considerable hazards and risks as well as
developed relevant policies, decisions and regulations to safeguard the shipping
industry by using this traditional approach. However, in the public mind the marine
industry is still crowned with the title of high risk and is always associated with
frequent tragic marine casualties and startling oil pollution etc. People cannot help
asking: are there any more appropriate approaches?
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1.3 Risk-based decision-making (RBDM)
Risk-based decision-making has become a hot topic recently in industry and
government, and the maritime community is no exception. The United States Coast
Guard (USCG, 2005) defines it as “a process that organizes information about the
possibility for one or more unwanted outcomes into a broad, orderly structure that
helps decision makers make more informed management choices”.
The adoption of different maritime policies will result in various outcomes. Some are
what we want while others are unwanted outcomes which include the harmful effects
on safety and health, environmental damage, property loss, or mission failure etc. An
obvious feature of risk-based decision-making differing from the traditional approach
to decision-making is that the information about the possibility for one or more
unwanted outcomes is considered. RBDM adds to the decision-making process a
systematic consideration of diverse risks that may be important to various
stakeholders. A wide range of risk analysis tools (from very simple to very
sophisticated) is available to help decision-makers develop the right information
about risks to support their decision-making. Macesker & Myers (2005) say: “The
question is not, ‘Should I use risk-based decision-making?’ The question is, ‘How
should I use risk-based decision-making?’ The key is to focus on using the most
suitable tool(s) for detailed situations.”
The need for risk-based decision-making in maritime policy is obvious, as the
resources that the public and private sectors can devote to navigational safety, traffic
efficiency and environmental protection are finite. If these limited resources are
spent dealing with low-risk problems at the expense of high-risk ones, then the
industry will be exposed to higher risks that cannot be withstood due to an imbalance
in resources distribution. The application of risk-based decision-making could
remedy these situations. Risk-based decision-making provides a powerful tool that
can help ensure that limited public and private resources are allocated more
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effectively to reducing risks, maximizing the protection of maritime safety and
environment as well as increasing traffic efficiency (AIChE, 1997).
1.4 Vessel Traffic Service (VTS)
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) can be defined as a service implemented by a
competent authority, designed to improve the safety and efficiency of vessel traffic
and to protect the environment. The service should have the capability to interact
with the traffic and to respond to traffic situations developing in the VTS area
(International Maritime Organization, 1997). The first VTS was established in
Douglas, Isle of Man, in 1948, in the form of a shore based radar station which could
provide traffic images in order to keep maritime traffic flows moving in port areas
and their approaches against the impact of poor visibility conditions, especially dense
fog that had seriously delayed and shut down the port operations. The early VTSs
were intended primarily to avoid traffic delays and to increase the efficiency of
traffic flows in general. However, attention was also being given to the number of
accidents and the way in which these might be reduced. The studies indicated that the
number of traffic accidents decreased significantly due to the establishment of VTS
(International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities,
2002). In the nineteen seventies major oil tanker disasters (e.g. Torrey Canyon,
Amoco Cadiz etc.) aroused public awareness of the importance of protecting marine
environment and people began pondering how to develop the role of VTS in
pollution prevention. In the meantime, IMO became concerned and discussed VTS
issues with IALA. In 1997, IMO adopted a new Assembly Resolution on VTS
(A.857(20)), “Guidelines For Vessel Traffic Services”, which superseded the old one
adopted in 1985. This Guideline, associated with SOLAS regulation V/8-2, describes
the principles and general operational provisions for the operation of a VTS and
participating vessels.
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Due to the development of larger and less manoeuvrable ships, the increasing traffic
volume, dangerous cargoes and the potential for environment pollution, establishing
a VTS to reduce these risks, as a valid measure, has been a practical solution in many
ports and waterways around the world. The number of VTS systems worldwide has
increased rapidly during the last two decades and there are now about 500 of these
services available in total. In particular, with the recent booming seaborne trade, the
implementation of new VTS and the re-assessment of an existing VTS worldwide are
reaching a new high tide. However, constructing a VTS is a considerable investment
and its subsequent operation is also very money-consuming; some VTSs do not play
an important role as people anticipate; many seafarers regard VTS simply as a party
they have to contact when passing through reporting lines while some VTS cannot
provide sophisticated services for crew or cannot meet local waterborne traffic
requirement; some VTSs have had to close down because of financial considerations,
(for instance New York VTS stopped its services in 1988 and reopened in 1990 due
to budget problems etc.). All these depressing news has prompted those persons, who
were enthused to establish VTS once, to speculate calmly about what is wrong with
it.
The maritime industry operates in an increasingly complex world in which changes –
technological, financial, organizational – take place more quickly, are more extensive
and run deeper than ever before. Rapid changes lead to higher risk and a greater need
to understand and analyse the risk. The final results will depend on how these factors
are dealt with in practice in advance and how the important elements are analysed
(Ullring, 1998). Consequently, how to plan a VTS perfectly, which will result in
fulfilling its functions validly, contributing in reaching its purposes to the greatest
extent as envisaged, and establishing whether the investment required is justified,
becomes key considerations faced by each VTS stakeholder.
The traditional approach to safety in the maritime sectors has been reactive - to react
to problems as they occur. Instead of reacting in an ad hoc way to a problem, a
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careful analysis of the risk situation should be carried out while keeping financial and
resource constraints in mind, which is of special importance to the concerned
stakeholders and decision-makers. So in order to lower risks rationally as much as
possible, it is suggested that when planning a VTS, decision-makers should use
proactive methods, which could be the application of the principle of risk-based
decision-making on maritime fields. A practical framework recommended by IMO
for RBDM on maritime fields is Formal Safety Assessment (FSA).
1.5 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
FSA was originally developed partly at least as a response to the Piper Alpha disaster
of 1988, when an offshore platform exploded in the North Sea and 167 people lost
their lives (IMO, 2005). As a result of the studies with respect to scientific decisionmaking for years, two organs of IMO, MSC and MEPC, jointly developed and
approved “the Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO
rule-making process”. As the Guidelines (2002) mention, FSA is a structured and
systematic methodology, aimed at enhancing maritime safety, including the
protection of life, health, the marine environment and property, by using risk analysis
and cost benefit assessment. It provides a framework for applying the principle of
RBDM in the IMO rule-making process.
Member Governments are also recommended to apply FSA when it is deemed
necessary. IMO (2002) stresses that its application would be particularly relevant to
proposals for regulatory measures which have far-reaching implications in terms of
either cost (to society or the maritime industry), or the legislative and administrative
burdens which may result. FSA may also be helpful when there is a need for risk
reduction but the outcomes of the required decisions are unclear. This gives Member
Governments a clearer insight into the policy and a trustworthy platform on which
they form policies. Similarly, it can assist stakeholders or decision-makers to
evaluate the rationality, necessity and cost-effectiveness of a marine project. So from
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the author’s point of view, it is very useful and significant to do the research
concerning the application of FSA, a framework of RBDM on the marine sector,
when planning VTS.
According to the IMO Guidelines (2002), FSA should comprise the following five
steps:
.1 identification of hazards;
.2 risk analysis;
.3 risk control options;
.4 cost benefit assessment; and
.5 recommendations for decision-making.
Figure 2 depicts a flow chart of the FSA methodology.
Decision-makers

FSA Methodology
Step 1
Hazard
Identification

Step 2
Risk
Assessment

Step 5
Decision-making
Recommendation

Step 3
Risk Control Options

Step 4
Cost Benefit Assessment

Figure 2: Flow chart of the FSA methodology

Source: International Maritime Organization. (2002). Guideline for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)
for Use in the IMO Rule-making Process (MSC/Circ.1023, MEPC/Circ.392). London: Author
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Many scientific disciplines deal with FSA in order to develop solutions for
applications in their particular field of interest. As a result of the ofteninterdisciplinary nature, numerous approaches for a variety of safety and security
problems have been developed over the years. Although there are many different
methodologies available in order to evaluate different kinds of risks they all follow
similar principles, which can be seen in the following Figure 3 (Schröder, 2005).
Identify risks

Evaluate hazards
• Establish underlying causes
• Determine extent/nature of consequences

Risk estimation
• Estimate hazard frequency (likelihood)
• Estimate risk

Risk analysis
Risk evaluation /
management

Evaluate risks
Compare risk levels with acceptance criteria

Are hazard control
measures adequate?

NO

Develop / introduce risk reduction
measures
• Hazard prevention
• Mitigation

Yes
No further action necessary but review
hazards and risk evaluation regularly

Figure 3: General risk assessment process
Source: Waring & Glendon (1998)

In practice, the process of FSA begins with the decision-makers defining the problem
to be assessed along with any relevant boundary conditions or constraints, then for
any potential problem or operation to be safeguarded risks and hazards need to be
identified first. Next, the identified risks need to be estimated and evaluated
separately or integrated against the defined risk acceptance criteria. If the assessed
risk is higher than the criteria, the corresponding risk control options need to be
specified in order to limit the risk down to a level with which the stakeholders or
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decision-makers would be satisfied or accept. In further steps, the specified options
need to be determined whether or not they are worthwhile through conducting a costbenefit analysis. The option that is assessed as a cost-effective one will generally be
adopted and presented in decision-making recommendations.
Undoubtedly, the above concepts and framework similarly are applicable to the
RBDM for planning VTS. However, VTS, as an option in implementing waterways
management, is different from other options in terms of principles, scale, scope, costs
and stakeholders. Consequently, detailed application of FSA on planning VTS would
definitely have its own features and characteristics, which have some significant
discrepancies from other options. In the following chapters, the author will introduce
the detailed methods and models, some of which are demonstrated and interpreted
through a concrete example of Wuhan Port, that in particular are suitable to the
general application of FSA on planning VTS. A short introduction to Wuhan Port
can be seen in Appendix A.

14

CHAPTER 2
Identification of Risks and Hazards
In the previous chapter, the concept and process of FSA was briefly introduced. FSA,
as a practical framework for RBDM on maritime sectors, adds to the decisionmaking process a systematic consideration of diverse risks and hazards that influence
the various stakeholders. So identification of the risks and hazards is logically
regarded as the first step of FSA, which comprises five steps in total as seen in
Figure 2.
At the inception of FSA, the first step is to answer the question of what categories of
hazards exist in the defined system, which lead to the failure or unacceptance of the
system. In its guideline for FSA, IMO (2002) points out that:
The purpose of step 1 is to identify a list of hazards and associated scenarios
prioritized by risk level specific to the problem under review. The purpose is
achieved by the use of standard techniques to identify hazards which can
contribute to accidents, and by screening these hazards using a combination
of available data and judgement.
As far as planning VTS is concerned, what categories of risks and hazards should be
identified depends on the purpose of VTS. As mentioned above, VTS may play an
important role, mainly in respect of improving maritime safety, the protection of the
marine environment and the efficiency of navigation. Consequently, it is necessary to
take into account those factors which directly determine the risk levels in these three
aspects or the deeper layer of factors which indirectly, however more systematically
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and essentially uncover the underlying causes behind the levels that can not be
accepted by decision makers and need to be improved by the means of establishing a
new VTS or upgrading an existing VTS. These two tiers of factors correspond to the
two approaches used for hazard identification. The former is achieved by using an
analytical technique whereas the latter is put into effect using creative methods. In
the Guidelines on Risk Management, IALA (2000) recommends that the two
approaches be combined in order to identify as many relevant hazards as possible.
In hazard identification methodology, the analytical element ensures that previous
experience is properly taken into account and typically makes use of background
information as followed in terms of planning VTS:
1. the existing navigational regulations;
2. historical statistical data on maritime accidents;
3. traffic volume per year within the planned VTS area;
4. main mixture of traffic flows (main crossing traffic flows against main traffic
flow);
5. the category and amount of dangerous cargoes loaded and discharged within the
defined port per year;
6. the local conditions like geography, hydro/meteo, tides and weather;
7. the local marine environment affected by shipping industry.
The creative element is to ensure that the identification process is proactive through
aiming at identifying the causes and effects of accidents and relevant hazards instead
of confining it only to hazards that have materialized in the past. As is known to all,
the human element is the most important contributory aspect to the causation and
avoidance of incidents. So appropriate techniques for incorporating human factors
should be used. In Resolution A.947 (23), IMO (2003) states that:
The human element is a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects marine
safety, security and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire
spectrum of human activities performed by ships’ crews, shore-based
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management, regulatory bodies, recognized organizations, shipyards,
legislators, and other relevant parties, all of whom need to co-operate to
address human element issues effectively.

In applying FSA when planning for a VTS, the decision-makers shall focus on how
errors in respect of ships’ crews, shore-based management and regulatory bodies lead
to the failure of the system which can be defended to reach an acceptable standard by
implementing waterways management, especially by establishing a VTS in a planned
area. In the third step of FSA, risk control options (RCOs) will be elaborated and
potential risk control measures (RCMs) could be identified through analysing these
human errors, so the underlying causes may also be left to step 3 to be uncovered.
2.1 Define problem
As a structure and systematic methodology by using risk analysis and cost benefit
assessment, FSA may be applied widely in fields from the IMO rule-making process
to a maritime administration proposal for regulatory measures, and from the
formulation of a new IMO instrument to planning a maritime project regardless of its
scope. Although FSA has a similar principle, concept and steps in all kinds of
research as long as it is applicable, decision-makers should take into account
different factors determining the performance of a system and its corresponding
range of study when aiming at a specific project or a category of projects so that the
problem under analysis and its boundaries could be carefully defined stating the
associated risk issues. This is the most important phase in FSA and it both guides the
whole process, how to be within a proper boundary, and guarantees that the limited
research resources are appropriately utilized and deployed.
The problem boundaries of a formal safety assessment study can be developed in the
following manner (Pillay and Wang, 2004):
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• Range of the vessel
• Geographical boundaries
• Risks to be considered
• Vessel systems
• Relevant regulations
• Measures of risks

Based on the above proposal of the specialists, as well as the features and functions
VTS has in doing waterways management, problem definition in terms of planning
VTS may focus on the following six aspects: VTS vessels, types of VTS, traffic rules
and regulations, risks to be considered, geographical boundaries and determination of
risks.

2.1.1 VTS vessels

VTS vessels mean the participating vessels in VTS. The targets that ship traffic
management aims at are the vessels in an assigned area, which generally do not cover
all vessels. In IMO Resolution A.857(20), it is recommended that vessels navigating
in an area where vessel traffic services are provided should make use of these
services and vessels should be allowed to use a VTS where mandatory participation
is not required. However, VTS vessels have to be equipped with the necessary
navigational aids and radio communication apparatus in accordance with SOLAS 74
while communication with the VTS and VTS vessels should be conducted on the
assigned frequencies or channels according to established ITU and SOLAS chapter
IV procedures. This is a mandatory requirement for VTS vessels in respect of
equipment. It has been shown that IMO does not coerce all ships into participating
VTS and it would be difficult to implement traffic management on those vessels
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especially when they do not possess any capability of communication. Generally
speaking, VTS services are rendered via VHF. Consequently, VTS vessels may be
defined as the vessels carrying VHF in the VTS area.
In the water area of Wuhan port, all ships must at least be equipped with VHF
working on channels 8 and 16 in accordance with the norm of Chinese river ship
construction and classification or SOLAS 74, except a very small number of wooden
fishing boats and barges without power which are always towed or pushed by tugs.
This provides a prerequisite for establishing VTS because communication, as one of
the essential ingredients of the VTS system, makes sure the establishment of valid
relations between VTS organization and VTS vessel.

2.1.2 Types of VTS

A VTS can improve the safety of traffic through the foresighted prevention of
situations of unacceptable risk, by contributing to safe encounters from the above
foresighted measures and by assisting ships to keep within navigable waters (IALA,
2002). In the process of FSA, the application of which would be particularly relevant
to proposals which may have far-reaching implications in terms of either cost or the
legislative and administrative burdens that may result, cost/benefit analysis plays a
vital role in justifying the discussed projects or measures. The benefits achievable by
a VTS depend on its types which may be divided by the services provided and the
functions performed, as follows:
The Information Service ensures that essential information is available in a timely
manner to the shipboard decision process, either by broadcasting at fixed times or if
deemed necessary by the VTS. This is normally provided to general traffic.
The Traffic Organisation Service is concerned with the forward planning of
movements to prevent the development of dangerous situations.
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The Navigational Assistance Service assists the navigational decision-making
process on board, participating by giving information and services.
The Co-operation with allied services and other interested parties is a supporting
service for exchanging information, using common data bases and action agreement.
(IALA, 2002)
When planning VTS, decision-makers should determine the type of planned VTS
and associated level of the above mentioned services on the basis of the outcomes of
hazard identification (step 1) and risk analysis (step 2).

2.1.3 Traffic rules and regulations

Although COLREG 1972 has a predominant status in worldwide seaborne traffic, as
far as port areas, coastal areas and other sensitive waters are concerned, navigation
safety and efficiency generally need to be reinforced through adopting and
implementing the relevant traffic rules and regulations which may include not only
those defining the navigational requirements such as traffic routes, speed limits,
anchorage areas etc, but also any special requirements such as compulsory pilotage
and pilot boarding areas, traffic separation schemes, ship reporting systems and
prohibited or precaution zones etc. In other words, the risk level of an area depends
on its traffic patterns to some extent.
The Port of Wuhan is a typical river port within which the Chinese River Code for
Preventing Collisions is the principal traffic rules. Meanwhile, the Code is
complemented by some local traffic rules and regulations promulgated by the
Yangtze MSA and Wuhan MSA in order to implement more effective waterways
management in the waters of Wuhan port. Compared to COLREG 72, the provisions
of the Code are much more complicated due to the features of the river and its traffic.
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However, as shown in Figure 4, the principle of the Code could be summarized in
one sentence: ships sailing down go by swift flow whereas ships going upstream
navigate by slow flow.

Area of slow flow
Area of swift flow
Area of swift flow

Area of slow flow

Main flow direction of the Yangtze River

Traffic flow:

Figure 4: an illustration of the principle of the Chinese River Code for Preventing Collisions
Another important traffic pattern is called the sailing cross area, as shown in Figure
5, where ships going upstream have to cross the traffic flow sailing down due to the
existence of a concave area shown as the shaded area in Figure 2, which can
influenced negatively the manoeuvrability of ships going upstream. Nevertheless, the
establishment of this area increases the probability of ship cross encounters and
collisions.
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Sailing cross area

Main flow direction of the Yangtze River:
Traffic flow of going upstream:

Dangerous concave area:

Figure 5: an illustration of the sailing cross area

2.1.4 Risks to be considered

What is risk? Is it synonymous to hazard? The report of a Royal Society Study Group
(1992) defines risk as “the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a
stated period of time, or results from a particular challenge where an adverse event is
an occurrence that produces harm”. As to hazard and harm, the report (1992) states
that “hazard is seen as the situation that in particular circumstances could lead to
harm, where harm is the loss to a human being (or to the human population)
consequent on damage and damage is the loss of inherent quality suffered by an
entity (physical and biological)”.
The risk management of waterways involves the systematic identification, evaluation
and control of potential losses, which may arise from future events which have an
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impact on the safety of the ship, marine environment and traffic efficiency. Examples
of these events are fires, explosions, environmental damage, release of toxic gases,
collisions, groundings, extreme weather, structural failure and loss of stability etc.
(Monioudis, 1997). So from the angle of the marine industry, risk can be explained
as the probability that a maritime incident occurs during a stated period of time.
Different agencies define marine incidents in different ways. In the Code for the
Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents (IMO, 1997), it is stated that:
Marine incident means an occurrence or event being caused by, or in
connection with, the operations of a ship by which the ship or any person is
imperilled, or as a result of which serious damage to the ship or structure or
the environment might be caused.

The Regulations of China on the Investigation and Handling of Maritime Traffic
Accidents (1990) is applicable to the following accidents occurring to vessels and
installations:
(1) Collision, strike or damage by waves;
(2) Hitting hidden rocks or running aground;
(3) Fire or explosion;
(4) Sinking;
(5) Damage or loss of machinery parts or important tools during a voyage
which affects the vessel's seaworthiness;
(6) Other maritime traffic accidents which cause losses in property and
human lives.
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However, in planning VTS, risks to be considered only comprise those accidents
related to movements and the dynamics of vessels that could be prevented or
decreased by VTS, including collision, grounding, hitting hidden rocks, contact,
wave damage etc, plus damage to the environment or fire and explosion if caused by
the above incidents. On the other hand, when making a cost/benefit analysis in the
fourth step of FSA, the decision-makers should take into consideration of other
accidents in estimating the benefit that the establishment of VTS can contribute to,
because VTS could participate in SAR activities and mitigate the consequence of
those accidents. For instance, an explosion caused by crew smoking on board the
ship should be excluded in identifying the risks and hazards of FSA step1, whereas it
should be considered in doing cost/benefit analysis if VTS is involved in the rescue
of this ship.

2.1.5 Geographical boundaries

There are three categories of VTS: Port or Harbour VTS, Coastal VTS and River
VTS. A Port VTS is mainly concerned with vessel traffic to and from a port or
harbour or harbours, while a Coastal VTS is mainly concerned with vessel traffic
passing through the area (IMO, VTS Guidelines, 1997). A River VTS which usually
renders information services as well as navigational assistance and traffic
organization services, could be regarded as a combination of these two types. In its
Guidelines, IMO sets out eleven criteria for an area in which VTS is particularly
appropriate if the area meets any of them. In fact, these criteria also theoretically
determine the geographical boundaries of a planned VTS. In FSA, the decisionmakers may refer to these criteria to define what areas need to be studied.
Wuhan port, as one of the busiest river ports in China, has a high traffic density,
complex navigation patterns and difficult hydrographical and hydrological elements.
Consequently, the whole water area of Wuhan port should be considered in applying

24

FSA when planning Wuhan VTS. The Geographical boundaries of this study are the
same as those described in a brief view of Wuhan port in Appendix A.

2.1.6 Determination of risk

Mathematically, risk is defined as the probability of an adverse event times its
impact. The probability can be simply expressed as the mean number of marine
accidents per year or be more complicatedly estimated by establishing mathematical
models, while the impact, provided that it occurs, can be calculated in different ways.
There are monetary methods, count methods and index methods.
Monetary methods are particularly appropriate to evaluate the loss in the form of
damage to property or economy. They also facilitate the analysts to categorize the
accidents in terms of loss as well as make acceptability and cost/benefit analyses in
the process of FSA due to its obvious comparability. However, in some
circumstances, it is not always easy to calculate the loss in monetary terms,
especially when life loss, damage to the environment and impact on mentality and
psychology are involved. Instead, it is sometimes easier to simply count the amount
of loss that happened in the stated years. Index methods, which determine the level
of risk by giving weight value to individual accidents, are a variety or a combination
of the former two kinds of methods. All these three types of methods can be used by
decision makers at their discretion in FSA according to the data and information they
can collect.
2.2 Identification of risks and hazards
It is recommended that the output from this step comprises a list of risks / hazards /
unwanted events and their preliminary description. The prioritisation of risk is
fundamental to the following analysis of risks. There are a number of ways in which
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this can be done and these will vary depending upon the risks under consideration
and the particular methodology being employed (Dickson, 2003).
The Chinese VTS project group (1989) thought that there are a lot of factors
contributing to marine accidents in harbours and affecting the level of port traffic
environment, which could be generally categorized into three main groups as shown
in Figure 6: hydro/meteo factors, fairway factors and vessel traffic factors. These
factors can be regarded as risks and hazards that need to be identified in planning
VTS.
Visibility
Hydro/meteo factors

Strong wind (including typhoon)
Maximum current speed

Length of main fairway

Harbour
Environment

Distance from dangerous objects
Fairway factors Intersect of fairways
Proportion of ship’s length and fairway’s breath
Proportion of ship’s breath and fairway’s breath
Vessel traffic factors

Vessel traffic volume per day
Density of vessels

Figure 6: Factors contributing to marine accidents and affecting the level of port traffic
environment
Source: Chinese VTS project group. (1989). Research Reports on Class Division of Vessel Traffic
Management In Coastal Harbour of China. Dalian: Author.

However, with globally seaborne transport for crude oil and dangerous cargoes on
the sharp increase, as well as reinforcement of public awareness on aspects of a
friendly environment, marine pollution has come more and more under the spotlight,
especially after the disastrous oil spill incidents such as the Exxon Valdez, Erika,
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Prestige etc. Consequently, it is necessary to add the factors covering dangerous
cargoes and marine pollution into the above lists for more comprehensive
identification of the local traffic hazards.
Then according to a preliminary description of these hazards, as well as qualitative
and quantitative analysis, the whole water area being studied in planning VTS can be
divided into several sub-areas which are ranked in view of the sensitivity of
navigation safety and the marine environment. Moreover, through collecting and
analysing the historical maritime accident data in the evaluated area, local accidents
or risks can also be ranked by considering types of accidents, types of loss and their
geographical distribution. Next, the comparison and combination between rank of
areas and rank of risks could result in a prioritized list of areas and a prioritized list
of risks. The model for Step1, identification of navigational and environmental risks,
is indicated in Figure 7:
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Define Problems

VTS
vessels

Types of
VTS

Local traffic hazards
Traffic volume

Relevant
regulations

Risks to be
considered

Geographical
subdivision
( Rank of Areas)

Main mix of traffic

Sub-Area 1

Local geographical conditions

Sub-Area 2

Hydro/meteo

Geographical
boundaries

Determination
of risks

Preliminary evaluation
of local accidents
Historical maritime
accidents data

Types of
accidents

Types
of loss

Geographical
distribution

Dangerous cargoes

Marine pollution

Sub-Area n

Rank of risks

Comparison & combination

Prioritized list of Areas

Prioritized list of risks

Figure 7: Step1 Identification of navigational and environmental risks
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2.2.1 Local traffic hazards

• Traffic volume
Traffic volume means the sum of amount of vessels in a specific area during a stated
time, including transit traffic, entry/leave port traffic and internal traffic, which
reflects to what extent the area is busy or congested. Generally speaking, more traffic
volume could result in higher maritime risks. Fujii & Matui (1984) give two
mathematic formulas as followed when estimating frequency of collisions with
objects and groundings as well as frequency of ships collision:
Nau 1 =

∫∫∫ ρ VD φ dLdVdt

(1)

Nau 2 = ∫∫∫ ∫∫∫ ∫∫∫ ( ρ 2 / 2)φ 1φ 2VrdL 1dL 2 dV 1dV 2 dSdt

(2)

Nau1 --- the number of ships in collisions with objects and groundings;
ρ --- the density of traffic;
V --- traffic flow speed;
D --- the cross section;
Φ --- the normalized distribution function of the ship length and the velocity;
L --- length of traffic flow;
t --- time;
Nau2 --- the number of collision of ships;
Φ1, Φ2 --- normalized distribution function of the ship size and velocity;
Vr --- the relative speed
S --- area.
The above formulas not only indicate the relation between density of traffic and
number of accidents but also illustrate that traffic volume is a considerable factor that
influences the local traffic risk.

29

The calculation of traffic volume in a defined area can be done through a visual
survey and looking up vessel arrival/departure/in-port traffic records. Due to the
limitation of human power and resources, it is impossible for researchers to carry out
a visual survey 365 days a year. Generally visual survey, which particularly is
appropriate to estimate the transit and entry/leave port traffic volume, is implemented
by recording the number, types and sizes of vessels passing through the observation
lines in three or four continuous days per three months or half a year. The result, as a
sample, can be used to estimate approximately the whole year traffic volume passing
those lines. Yang & Wu (1992) gave the formula as follows for calculating traffic
volume per year. The traffic volume per year (1999-2003) in Wuhan port and its
distribution can be seen in Appendix B.
K=

m

1
m

∑ (K
j =1

j

+

n

365
n

∑K
i =1

ji

)

(3)

K: the mean traffic volume per year;
m: the number of years carrying out visual survey;
Kj: internal traffic volume in No.j year;
n: the number of days carrying out visual survey per year;
Kji: visual survey traffic volume in No.i day in No.j year.

• Main mix of traffic
It is easily understood that most collisions between ships happen in crossing
situations rather than in the case of overtaking and head-on. The mix of traffic is a
very important factor determining the complexity of local traffic. Baldauf (2003)
gave statistics concerning the comparison of accident numbers in the previous traffic
mode and the new one adopting the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the UK
coastal area from 1957 to 1981, as follows.
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Table 1: Accident number in UK coastal area from 1957 to 1981
Sea area
1957-1961 1962-1966 1967-1971 1972-1976 1977-1981
Strait of Dover
52
56
36
14
12
Southern North Sea
79
81
66
29
19
English Channel
23
30
22
21
14
Total
154
167
124
64
45
Close to/in TSS
128
140
89
34
24
Outside TSS
28
36
29
30
21
Source: Baldauf, Michael (2003). Statistics about the Comparison of Accidents Number in Previous
Traffic Mode and New One Adopting TSS in UK Coastal Area From 1957 to 1981. The Personal
Communication. Wismar University: Author.
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140
120
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Figure 8: Accident number in UK coastal area from 1957 to 1981
Source: Baldauf, Michael (2003). Statistics about the Comparison of Accidents Number in Previous
Traffic Mode and New One Adopting TSS in UK Coastal Area From 1957 to 1981. The Personal
Communication. Wismar University: Author.

TSS is one kind of ships’ routing, which provides for the separation of opposing
streams of traffic by appropriate means and by the establishment of traffic lanes,
reduces dangers of collision between crossing traffic and ships in established traffic
lanes as well as simplifies the patterns of traffic flow in converging areas (Transport
Canada, 1991). For the above statistics indicated in Table 1 and Figure 8, it can be
concluded that where close to / in TSS, the number of marine accidents dramatically
decreased while outside TSS the level of traffic risk was still kept relatively
invariable. So the more line intersects created by the max of traffic in the defined
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area, the more complicated the traffic mode is and the more probabilities of marine
incidents there will be. The quantity of encountering points can be regarded as one of
the parameters for evaluating and prioritizing the areas in terms of risks. The main
mix of traffic in Wuhan Port is briefly introduced in Appendix B.
• Hydrology / meteo
In respect of hydrology / meteo, the factors giving influence to accident probability
mainly include visibility, current and wind.
Poor visibility is caused by fog in most circumstances. It tremendously reduces the
amount of information that seafarers on board vessels can obtain from outside due to
the limitation of their visual sense so that officers manoeuvring vessels have great
difficulty in making appropriate decisions. In harbour and river areas, the local
Maritime Authority generally promulgates strict navigation rules upon a vessel’s
behaviour in poor visual range while COLREG states in Rule 19 (conduct of vessels
in restricted visibility) that every vessel should proceed at a safe speed adapted to the
prevailing circumstances and restricted visibility. Fujii and Yamanouchi (1974)
divided 562 collisions and 354 groundings in six Japanese straits from 1966 to 1971
into groups with respect to the visual range and the analysis with these data and the
frequency of visual ranges indicates that the ratio of the number of accidents is
inversely proportional to the visual range for both collision and grounding.
Furthermore, when visibility is below a certain extent, vessel traffic in harbour could
have to stop totally. So poor visibility has a considerable impact upon traffic
efficiency and traffic safety.
Wind and current also influence the traffic volume and frequency of accidents.
Strong winds can lead to a ship’s deviation from planned lines and restriction in its
ability to manoeuvre, which may possibly result in a grounding or collision
especially in narrow channels and fairways. After studying the relationship between
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the number of relative accidents and wind speed, Qi (1991) gave the following
formula:
kw = 7.9vw – 11.6 , kw ≥ 0
kw --- number of relative accidents;
vw--- wind force on the Beaufort scale.
This formula indicates that there is a linear feature between kw and vw and different
wind forces have different impacts on vessel traffic safety.
The effects of current on vessel traffic mainly focus on two aspects: one is the
influence on movement and manoeuvre functions of a vessel while another is on
traffic volume. When a vessel goes upstream within the current, its rudder effect will
generally improve. Conversely when it sails down, it is more difficult for the crew to
manipulate the ship due to the poorer rudder effect. In addition, cross currents may
give rise to a ship’s deviation from correct lines and lead to traffic accidents. In some
harbours affected by tide, small boats often catch tides for easily entering into or
departing from the harbours so that traffic volume sharply increases at that time.
Kandori (1972) analyzed the influence of current and wind and indicated that
collision risk increases three times for tidal current over six knots in Hayatomoseto
but a survey in Oseto did not underwrite this tendency. His study showed a
considerable increase in the risks of both collision and grounding in the Kanmon
Strait for winds over 20 knots. From these studies, we can also draw a conclusion
that visibility, current and wind are the hazards that need to be identified in planning
VTS. A short introduction of visibility, current and wind in Wuhan Port can be seen
in Appendix B.

• Dangerous cargoes and marine pollution
The harmfulness of dangerous cargoes mainly consists of their operational,
intentional and accidental discharge into oceans, seas and rivers as well as the
second-effect on seafarers, ships and environment such as fire, explosion and spills

33

etc., when vessels carrying them are involved in marine accidents. The briefing of
dangerous cargoes in Wuhan Port is illustrated in Appendix B.
Seas, rivers and marine shoreline areas are important public and ecological resources.
Water environments affect human health as they are often used for drinking water.
The water and shoreline also provide public recreation area throughout the world and
serve as homes to a variety of wildlife species including mammals, aquatic birds,
fish, microorganisms, and vegetation. However, their cleanliness and beauty, and the
survival of the species that inhabit them, can be threatened by accidents that occur
when oil and dangerous products are produced, stored and transported (EPA, 1999).
In addition, once pollution happens, the associated costs for clean-up operations
including shoreline clean-up and recovery of sunken oil may be significant even
when only small quantities of spilled oil are involved.
Figure 9 illustrates that there is no linear relationship between spill cost and size of
tanker (which might in turn be considered indicative of spill volume). Indeed, some
of the most expensive spills have been caused by relatively small tankers. In these
cases the most important factor has been the type and place of oil spilled. For
example, both the NAKHODKA and ERIKA spilled heavy fuel oil, which is highly
persistent and came ashore along long lengths of coastline (ITOPF, 2004). So
maritime pollution also ought to be identified as a kind of hazard in applying FSA on
planning VTS.

34

Figure 9: The costs of oil spills
Source: International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited. (2004). The Costs of Oil Spills.
From the World Wide Web: http://www.itopf.com/costs.html

• Local geographical conditions
To the impact of geographical conditions, IALA (2002) states: “The local geography
will be the determining influence on the size of the area to be covered by a VTS. In
the case of ports these vary enormously in their geography. Some ports, are
extremely simple and are little more than an indentation in the coast protected by
breakwaters. Entry/exit is through a passage between the breakwater heads, which
give direct access to the open sea. Vessels are only restricted in their freedom to
manoeuvre as they pass through the breakwater and into the port itself. At the other
extreme are estuarial ports, often far from the open sea with long approaches
encumbered by shallow, shifting sandbanks. Vessels using these ports will be
restricted navigationally and possibly be unable to anchor or reveres course over long
stretches of their passage. The prevailing weather, in particular visibility and wind
together with the tidal range and stream, may impose difficulties on the ability to
navigate safely. Together with the local geography they determine the degree of
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navigational difficulty likely to be encountered by a vessel.” The geographical
conditions in Wuhan Port are briefly introduced in Appendix B.

2.2.2 Geographical Division

The whole water area studied can be geographically divided into several sub-areas
and ranked if necessary, especially when the size of the area is immense, according
to the scenario of those factors determining the level of risks in the studied area in
the process of planning VTS.
Wuhan Port is spanned about 150 km along its main channel and 55 km along its
branch channel. By considering the above principle, the Port can be delimited into
four sub-areas. Their geographical descriptions are shown as follows:
Sub-area1: from the downriver boundary of Wuhan Port to Qingshanxia anchorage;
Sub-area2: from Qingshanxia anchorage to Wuhan third bridge of Yangtze River;
Sub-area3: from Wuhan third bridge of Yangtze River to upriver boundary of Port;
Sub-area4: the Hanjiang section of the Port.

2.2.3 Preliminary rank of sub-areas

As mentioned above, local traffic hazards comprise six factors: traffic volume, main
mix of traffic, hydro/meteo, dangerous cargoes, marine pollution and local
geographical conditions. The ranking of sub-areas can be identified through a
comparison of their respective rank in six factors. For instance, a certain factor has
different levels of risks in different sub-areas. As far as this factor is concerned, one
sub-area will be given a higher value if this factor in this sub-area is more severe to
navigation safety, environmental protection and traffic efficiency than that in another
sub-area. Then all the values to different factors in each sub-area are
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comprehensively evaluated and weighed in order to appropriately rank the different
sub-areas.
Wuhan Port is divided into four sub-areas. One sub-area is characterized as 4 with
regard to a factor if this sub-area has the highest risk in respect of this factor among
all the sub-areas. However, it will be valued as 1 if it has the lowest risk. According
to the scenario of these factors, four sub-areas in Wuhan Port are assessed as shown
in Table 2 and Figure 10.
Table 2: Rank of sub-areas in Wuhan Port
factors to be considered

sub-area1

sub-area2

sub-area3

sub-area4

traffic volume

3

4

2

1

main mix of traffic

2

4

3

1

hydro/meteo

4

4

4

1

dangerous cargoes

4

3

2

1

marine pollution

3

4

3

4

local geographical conditions

3

4

2

1
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Figure 10: Rank of sub-areas in Wuhan Port
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Table 2 and Figure 10 indicate that sub-area2 has the highest risk in all factors except
dangerous cargoes while sub-area4 has the lowest risk in each factor except marine
pollution. Consequently, the preliminary ranking of sub-areas in terms of risk can be
approximately identified from high to low as follows:
{ sub-area2; sub-area1; sub-area3; sub-area4 }

2.2.4 Preliminary evaluation of local accidents

The evaluation of risks depends on the accuracy and volume of collected data on
casualties. Therefore, the collection of data would be a vital element in the successful
objective application of the FSA, although it is possible to use subjective evaluation
as an interim means with a reasonable degree of accuracy (Sekimizu, 1997). In the
preliminary evaluation of local accidents, historical maritime accidents data can be
collected from the Maritime Administration and analysed through identifying types
of accidents, types of loss and the geographical distribution of accidents so that a
justified rank of risks can be formed.
Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of incident types in Wuhan Port. It can be noted
that almost 70% of all accidents recorded by the Maritime Safety Administration
were collisions, groundings, contact, contact bridge, hitting rock or wave damage
that is related to the movements and dynamics of vessels and can be called traffic
accidents.
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fire/explosion
6.1%

heavy weather
damage
5.2%
others
4.2%

machinery failure
7.1%

collision
33.0%

wave damage
2.8%
hitting hidden rock
3.3%

capsized/list
2.4%

foundering/sinking
5.7%

contact bridge
5.2%

contact
7.1%

grounding
17.9%

Figure 11: Average Distribution of Incident Types in Wuhan Port (2000-2004)
Source: Wuhan MSA. (2000-2004).

Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of loss types in Wuhan Port from 2000 to 2004.
It can be concluded that loss was severest in 2002 and 2003 whereas it was relatively
minor in 2001.
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Figure Distribution of Loss Types (2000 - 2004)
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Figure 12: Distribution of Loss Types in Wuhan Port (2000-2004)
Source: Wuhan MSA. (2000-2004).

The geographical distribution of all reported marine traffic incidents in Wuhan Port,
developed from data for 2000 to 2004, is shown in Figure 13. the majority of
incidents were concentrated in sub-area2 and sub-area3.
From the above analysis of historical data, the outcome for ranking of risks can be
roughly expressed from high to low as follows:
{ collisions, grounding, contact, contact bridge, hitting rock, wave damage }
{ sub-area2, sub-area3, sub-area1, sub-area4 }
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Figure 13: Geographical Distribution of Traffic Incidents in Wuhan Port (2000-2004)
Source: Wuhan MSA. (2000-2004).

2.2.5 Comparison and combination

The output from Step 1 of FSA comprises a prioritized list of risks/hazards/unwanted
events by risk level and a preliminary description of the risks/hazards/unwanted
events, which can be generated by comparison and combination of the identified
scenarios of local traffic hazards, geographical subdivision, rank of sub-areas and
rank of risks that all have been completed in previous phases. In order to reach the
goal, methods of qualitative or quantitative analysis can be available, mainly
depending on the scope of the collected data and the perspective of analysing the
problems.
Wuahan Port suffered from the fewest marine casualties in 2001, when its traffic
volume was also the lowest, among the recent five years. It can partially underline
the hypothesis that traffic volume is an important factor determining the risk level in
Wuhan Port because other factors influencing risk level remained relatively
unchanged in these five years. Meanwhile, a statistical analysis of environmental
factors has been conducted to identify if there is any close correlation between
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collisions / grounding / contact / contact bridge incidents and poor visibility, high
wind, adverse weather and strong currents; however, none has been identified as
having high enough significance. So, it can be said that these incidents making up the
majority of all incidents, were mainly caused by the factors of traffic volume, local
geographical conditions and traffic mix instead of hydro/meteo factors.

2.2.6 Conclusion

The outcome of the above analysis can promote the formation of prioritized lists with
respect to risks, hazards and sub-areas. The lists for Wuhan Port are displayed by risk
levels from high to low, as follows:
Sub-areas: { sub-area2, sub-area3, sub-area1, sub-area4 };
Risks: { collisions, grounding, contact, contact bridge, hitting rock, wave damage };
Hazards: { traffic volume, local geographical conditions, main mix of traffic,
dangerous cargoes, hydro/meteo, marine pollution }.
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CHAPTER 3
Risk analysis
In the previous chapter it has been shown how a framework addresses the
identification of risks and hazards in a planned VTS area in the context of planning
VTS. When those identified risks occur there will always be an effect upon the risk
level of the planned area. Therefore, their frequency and consequence have to be not
only measured in some way but also assessed in a combined way by the stakeholders
in order to determine whether or not they will be accepted.
The preceding step in FSA is to answer the question of what categories of hazards
exist in the defined system while the second step is to reveal how and to what extent
they lead to the failure or unacceptance of the system. In its guideline for FSA, IMO
(2002) points out that:
The purpose of the risk analysis in step 2 is a detailed investigation of the
causes and consequences of the more important scenarios identified in step 1.
This can be achieved by the use of suitable techniques that model the risk.
This allows attention to be focused upon high risk areas and to identify and
evaluate the factors which influence the level of risk.

As far as planning VTS is concerned, the choice of risk analysis model depends on
the features of system that decision makers are studying or concentrating on. VTS is
a complicated and large marine project, the establishment of which does not focus on
the safety of a certain ship or a certain kind of marine incident but concerns the
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navigation safety of all VTS vessels and their traffic efficiency as a whole as well as
all marine traffic accidents in a vast VTS area. It determines that the applicable risk
analysis model for planning VTS is macroscopic rather than microcosmic although
macroscopic may be made up of several microcosmic units.
Ayyub (2005) states: “When assessing and evaluating the uncertainties associated
with an event, risk is defined as the potential for loss as a result of a system failure,
and can be influenced by a pair of factors, one being the probability of occurrence of
an event, also called a failure scenario, and the other being the potential outcome or
consequence associated with the event’s occurrence”. This pairing can be represented
by the equation:
 Consequenc e 
 Event 
 Consequenc e 
Risk 
 = Likelihood 
 × impact 

Event
Time
Time







(Ayyub, 2005)

So risk analysis is assumed to include two major sub-activities, risk estimation and
risk evaluation, where risk estimation comprises event-probability assessment and
consequence assessment, and risk evaluation requires the definition of acceptable
risk and a comparative evaluation of options.

3.1 Risk estimation
Information produced from the hazard identification phase will be processed to
estimate risk. In the risk estimation phase, the likelihood and possible consequences
of each System Failure Event (SFE) will be estimated, either on a qualitative basis or
a quantitative basis (if the events are readily quantified) (Pillay & Wang, 2004).
The purpose of frequency analysis is to determine how often a particular scenario
might be expected to occur over a specified period of time. These estimates are often
based on historical data, where judgements about the future are based on what has
occurred in the past. If there are no relevant historical data available, or if these data
are sparse, other methods such as fault-tree, or event-tree analysis, or other
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mathematical or econometric models may be used. Estimates may also be based on
expert experience and judgement. Most often, frequency estimates are based on a
combination of these methods (IALA, 2000).
In planning VTS, consequence analysis mainly involves estimating the impact in
respect of navigation safety, traffic efficiency and the marine environment, which is
determined by the purpose of establishing a VTS. The impact on navigation safety
can be measured by three factors: numbers of injuries or deaths, property loss and
other direct economic loss caused by traffic accidents while the impact on traffic
efficiency can be estimated in two different ways: the annual day numbers of bad
visibility which could stop local waterborne transport and the traffic density which
could lead to traffic congestion in a certain area once it is too high. Impact on the
marine environment has to some extent to do with the type and place of oil spilled as
well as the local ecological environment and its sensitivity, which can be measured
by numbers of wildlife affected, how heavy the influence on the quality of human
life is and the associated costs for clean-up operations.

3.1.1 Recommended models for risk estimation

In IMO’s guidelines for FAS, several techniques are recommended for use in the
process of risk analysis, which include fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree analysis
(ETA), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), hazard and operability studies
(HAZOP), the what-if analysis technique, risk contribution tree (RCT) and influence
diagrams. However, each method has its own appropriately applied fields and
limitations, especially when they are intended to be used in a large marine project
such as planning for VTS.
• Fault tree analysis (FTA)
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Fault tree analysis is a technique that, by means of tree structures, visually models
the logical causal relationship between events that singly or in combination cause
accidents, and determines the probability of a top event, which may be a type of
accident or unintended hazardous outcome (IMO, 2002). One of applications of FTA
on planning VTS for Wuhan Port can be exemplified as shown in Figure 14:
Contact bridge probability in Wuhan Port ( Pc ) = 0.9x (9.1 E –4) + 0.1x (1.87 E –3) ≈ 1.01 E -3
Contact bridge
Probability: Pc=

Human error
2.6 E -4

or

or

A1
In good visibility

In bad visibility

and

stress
2.0 E -5

and
9.1 E -4

0.9

Human error or
rudder failure

Good visibility

Human error or rudder
or radar failure

or

A

6.5 E -4
D

fatigue
2.0 E -5

A4
Lack of valid watchkeeping
1.0 E- 4

B2
Bad visibility

or

2.6 E -4

asleep
1.2 E- 4

A3

0.1

1.87 E- 3

B1

A2

9.6 E -4
A

D

R

Human error rudder failure Human error rudder failure
2.6 E -4
6.5 E -4

radar failure

Figure 14: Contact bridge FTA in Wuhan Port
Source: Based on Friis-Hansen’ model (2005)

FTA can be conducted qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitatively the relationship
among events is illustrated; quantitatively the risk level and the relative importance
of various events can be calculated. FTA is able to analyse common cause failures
and failures caused by events in combination. It is effective when used to analyse the
root causes of specific accidents with relatively complex combinations of events
(Xie, 2001). However, FTA is a technique with a narrow focus; it only examines one
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specific accident of interest. More fault trees should be developed in order to analyse
other types of accidents. The quantification of analysis requires significant expertise
and reliable statistical data (USCG, 2005).
• Event tree analysis (ETA)
Event tree analysis is a technique, which by means of a tree structure, visually
models the possible outcomes of an initiating event. The model illustrates how
safeguards and external influences, called lines of assurance, affect the path of
accident chains (USCG, 2005). One example of ETA, which may be used in the
process of risk analysis for planning VTS, is indicated in Figure 15 and Table 3:
a

A
B│A
b│A
C│AB
c│AB
D│ABC
d│ABC
E│ABCD

e│ABCD
F│ABCDE

f│ABCDE
g1│ABCDEF
g2│a
S

G2│a

F7
1x10

g2│Ab

-7 S

G2│Ab

F6
9x10

G2│ABCd

G2│ABc

g2│ABc
-11 S

g2│ABCd

F5 S
≈0

G2│ABCDe

g2│ABCDe

F4 S
≈0

G2│ABCDEf

g2│ABCDEf

F3 S
≈0

F2
≈0

S

G1│ABCDEF

F1
5x10

-10

Collision with an inspected vessel = µ x (PF1+PF2+PF3+PF4+PF5+PF6+PF7)
≈ (3650/yr) x (1.006x10-7) ≈ 3.67x10-4/yr
Where: µ is the number of times per year that a passenger ferry is on a collision course with an
inspected vessel (assuming that it is 0.5 time when it passes through the Yangtze River and it passes
20 times a day, so µ = 0.5 x 20 x 365 = 3650/yr); s is safety while F is failure.

Figure 15: ETA for passenger ferry on collision course with inspected vessel in Wuhan Port
Source: Based on Guthrie’ model. (2000).
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Table 3: Failure Description in ETA
Estimated
Safety Failure
Conditional
symbol symbol
Failure Description
Probability
a
A passenger ferry officer fails to observe inspected vessel on radar
0.001
b
B
passenger ferry co-officer fails to observe inspected vessel on radar
0.1
c
C
passenger ferry officer fails to observe (see or hear) inspected vessel
0.01
d
D passenger ferry co-officer fails to observe (see or hear) inspected vessel
0.1
e
E
passenger ferry wheelman fails to observe (see or hear) inspected vessel
0.5
f
F
no communication to passenger ferry from other vessel
0.01
passenger ferry fails to adequately maneuver in time to avoid collision
g1
G1 with inspected vessel given inspected vessel is not observed
1.0
passenger ferry fails to adequately maneuver in time to avoid collision
g2
G2 with inspected vessel given inspected vessel is observed
0.0000007
Source: Based on Guthrie’ model. (2000).

Qualitatively ETA shows the development path of accidents from the initiating
events while it quantitatively presents the frequency, consequence of various
sequence, and the relative importance of various sequence and contributing events. It
is applicable for almost any kind of system while its scope is limited to only one
initiating event; it is very effective to model accidents for the system with multiple
safeguards and to determine the consequence brought about by various initiating
events while it is not effective to be used to identify all causes that can result in
accidents. The subtle dependency among various lines of assurance could be easily
overlooked, which may lead to a certain uncertainty and incompleteness in the
analysis (USCG, 2005).
• Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is an analysis tool assuming that a failure mode occurs in a system /
component through some failure mechanism and the effects of this failure at this
level and at high levels are then analysed and evaluated to determine their severity on
the system as a whole while relevant actions are identified in order to eliminate or
mitigate these effects. The application of this technique has been introduced in IMO
High Speed Craft Code.
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Being a systematic and highly structured technique, FMEA is primarily used in
mechanical and electrical systems. In the application of FSA on planning VTS, it
may be suitable to help analysing single failure modes causing onboard system
failures such as radar, steering engine etc., that lead to marine casualty influencing
the risk level in the planned area.
FMEA only analyses the effects of a single component failure; it can identify single
failure modes that may cause system failure, however it is not possible to analyse the
problems caused by combinations of component failures. In addition, FMEA focuses
on how equipment failure can occur, those human factors, external influences that do
not cause equipment failure are often overlooked although they may present dangers
directly to human beings or the system as a whole (USCG, 2005).
• Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)
HAZOP is a qualitative method used to analyse hazards in a system with the aim to
eliminate or minimise them. It uses “guidewords” to identify hazards and studies
deviations from the design objectives of a system and components in order to seek
answers to the causes and consequences of these deviations and how to eliminate or
defend them. Dickson (1987) developed a sheet for HAZOP to record the findings of
the analysis under columns for guidewords, deviation, cause, consequences and
actions. Table 4 is an example of the sheet for HAZOP:
Table 4: Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)
Guidewords Deviations
No
No flow

Causes
Consequences
Actions
tank empty,
no petrol gets to vehicles,
regular checking of tank,
inlet valve V1 is shut, petrol seeps out of pipes, vavles to be checked everyday,
pump is not working,
hose bursts.
regular maintenance of the pump.
hose blocked.

Source: Dickson (1987)
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HAZOP is used primarily for systems with a continuous process, especially fluid, air
and thermal systems. Its disadvantages are that it requires a well-defined system;
investment of time is expensive; in case the system is simplified to facilitate the
study, there is the risk that certain aspects may be omitted; and it focuses only on
identifying single failure so that it is not able to analyse failure caused by a
combination of events (Xie, 2001).
• What-if analysis technique
What-if analysis is a brainstorming approach that uses broad, loosely structured
questioning, for instance, “what if the relieve valve fails to open?” and suchlike
queries, to assume potential failures that may result in accidents or system
performance problems and ensure that appropriate safeguards against those problems
are in place.
As a qualitative technique, it may be generally applicable for almost every type of
risk assessment application, especially those dominated by relatively simple failure
scenarios but is most often used to supplement other, more structured risk analysis
techniques. In addition, the loose structure of what-if analysis relies exclusively on
the knowledge of the participants to identify potential problems. If the team fails to
ask important questions, the analysis is likely to overlook potentially important
weaknesses (USCG, 2005).
• Risk contribution tree (RCT)
RCT may be used as a mechanism for displaying diagrammatically the distribution
of risk amongst different accident categories and sub-categories. Structuring the tree
starts with the accident categories, which may be divided into sub-categories to the
extent that available data allow and logic dictates. The preliminary fault and event
trees can be developed based on the hazards identified in step 1 to demonstrate how
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direct causes initiate and combine to cause accidents (using fault trees), and also how
accidents may progress further to result in different magnitudes of loss (using event
trees) (IMO, 2002). One example is attached, as shown in Figure 16, to illustrate how
to use this approach in the phase of risk analysis for planning VTS.
Event Trees for
consequences of
collisions happening
in planned area

Accident categories:
Grounding

Wave damage

Crossing
situation
collision

Collision

Head-on
situation
collision

Contact

Overtaking
situation
collision

Contact bridge

Suction
between
ships

…….

Accident sub-categories

or

Cause A
and

E1

Fault Trees for
causes, initiating
events and
probability of
overtaking
situation collision

Cause B
or

E2

Cause C

Cause D

Figure 16: Risk contribution tree (RCT) for planning VTS
Source: Based on IMO’s model. (2002).

Comparing the above models, RCT would be the more appropriate provided that
these models are singly used for risk analysis of the planned area, because one RCT
can deal with all accident categories which need to be analysed in planning VTS.
However, the outcome of RCT consists of different risk levels brought about by
different categories of marine accidents, which are measured by two parameters
including probability and consequence. The question of how to integrate these risk
levels corresponding to different categories of accidents into a comprehensive risk

51

level for the planned area, which will determine the acceptability of stakeholders, is
still not answered.

3.1.2 Risk index approach for risk estimation

From the above introduction, it can be put forward that these models may be used for
risk estimation in planning VTS to some extent, nevertheless with their peculiar
drawbacks and limitation, they are all appropriate especially to relatively small and
simple projects instead of large and complicated ones such as VTS, if they are used
singly, because what each of them can bring to light is just a tiny corner of the
iceberg compared with the whole scenario that needs to be researched in planning for
a VTS. Although it is theoretically feasible that risk estimation for planning VTS is
conducted through a combination of these models, the process would be
tremendously wearisome and miscellaneous so that analysts easily lose their way in
so complex a wordplay and figure game. Therefore it is necessary to seek a new
model exclusively for risk estimation for planning for a VTS.
The so-called risk estimation virtually predicts the future risk in a planned area which
can be conducted through two distinct schools, where one uses the past to predict the
future by analysing historical data whereas the other predicts the future qualitatively
and / or quantitatively with the aid of mathematical models or expert experience and
judgement. However as far as the latter is concerned, the establishment of models
and expert views are actually still based on previous or historical experience as well,
so they have a common character in this point with the former. Both of them are
dominated by unpredictable uncertainty to some extent.
In step 1 of FSA, the local traffic hazards, including traffic volume, main max of
traffic, local geographical conditions, hydro/meteo, dangerous cargoes and marine
pollution, are identified and it is easily understood that a combination of them
approximately determines the local traffic risk level. In these six factors, traffic
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volume in a defined area always varies with the fluctuation of the maritime industry
while others keep relatively unchanged over a period. So it can be said that variety in
traffic volume is a crucial factor influencing the change of risk level in a defined area
and there should also be a close correlation between traffic volume and risk level.
This conclusion can be given support to by many experts’ opinions and statistical
data, including the Wuhan Port scenario.
In his book, Wu (1992) put forward an approach called the risk index theory, which
can be easily implemented and has a fairly good operability and comparability. The
theory states that the traffic risk state in an area in a period can be measured by the

ratio of numbers of marine accidents and traffic volume in the area in the period:
R=P/Q

(R: risk index; P: numbers of marine accidents; Q: traffic volume)

Contact, grounding, contact bridge, hitting rock and wave damage etc. can be all
regarded as collisions between ship and stationary objects. Thus nearly all marine
traffic accidents can be classified into collision. Qiu (1991) cites a formula, as
follows, from a scholar studying the collisions between gas molecules to illustrate the
relationship between vessel traffic density and the number of collisions:
P=

 − Cρ 
KVρ
exp 

ρ max − ρ
Vρ max 
P: number of collisions;
V: ships’ mean speed;

ρ: vessel traffic density;
ρmax : maximum vessel traffic density;
K: domain coefficient 1;
C: domain coefficient 2.
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P

ρx

ρmax

ρ

Figure 17: Relation between vessel traffic density and the number of collisions
Source: Based on Qiu’ formula. (1991).

Figure 17 describes the formula showing that number of collisions P will increase
with the traffic density ρ (nearly linear relation) especially when ρ is not too much
(when ρ ranges from 0 ~ ρx). This obvious correlation between P and ρ can justify
Wu’s theory that traffic risk state in an area in a period can be measured by the ratio
of numbers of marine accidents and traffic volume in the area in the period.
As, in a planned area, there exists much diversification in respect of ships’ categories
and sizes as well as traffic accidents’ categories, scale and loss, it is necessary to

weight the traffic volume and number of traffic accidents in order to more
objectively reflect and describe the risk state in a planned area over a period.

3.1.2.1 Weighted vessel traffic volume Qk
Each ship is given a weighted coefficient according to its size (length or tonnage)
and the sum of the weighted coefficients for all ships stands for the weighted vessel
traffic volume QK in the area. Table 5 shows the weighted coefficients that can be
used in the Wuhan Port case.
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Table 5: Weighted coefficient according to ship’s size
ship's length(LOA: m)
weighted coefficient

0~<10
0.25

10~<30
0.5

ship's length(LOA: m)
weighted coefficient

100~<150
1.7

30~<50
1

50~<75
1.18

150~<200 200~<250 250~<300
2
2.5
3

75~<100
1.41
300~
4

Source: Based on Wu’ risk index theory. (1992).

3.1.2.2 Weighted number of traffic accidents Pk
5

Pk = ∑ f j Pj
j =1

j: accident classification ( 1 ~ 5 );
fj : weighted coefficient for No.j class of accident;
Pj: number of No.j class of accidents happening in the area.

Table 6: Weighted coefficient according to accident’ severity
accident classification ( j)
severity
weighted coefficient ( fj )

1
catastrophic
10

2
severe
6

3
significant
4

4
medium
1

5
minor
0.5

Source: Based on Wu’ risk index theory. (1992).

The division of severity, as developed by the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency
(1991), and referred to in Table 7, defines casualties, where a represents the loss of
ship and cargo, b stands for amount of oil spilled and c indicates the number of life
loss. If the following formula is reached, the casualty will be defined as a relevant
classification:

a / A + b/ B + c /C ≥1
This method for division can be easily conducted. In addition, it gives consideration
to the marine environmental protection through putting the oil spilled quantitatively
into the ingredient of accidents.
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Table 7: Defining casualties
total loss A
amount of oil spilled B
severity / accident categories
(GT)
(Kl)
catastrophic
20000
20000
severe
3000
3000
significant
500
500
medium
100
100
minor
20
20
Source: Japanese Maritime Safety Agency. (1991).

loss of life C
(person)
20
5
1
injure
…..

As far as planning for a VTS is concerned, the risk level is also influenced by vessel
traffic efficiency because high efficiency is one of the goals that establishing a VTS
pursues. In most circumstances, traffic efficiency is compromised by poor visibility,
however its consequence can hardly be calculated precisely. One of the solutions is
to count up the number of fog days per year and regard one fog-day as a medium
marine casualty.

3.1.2.3 Risk index
To sum up, the risk index in a planned area over a period can be obtained through:
5

P
R= k =
QK

∑f
j =1

j

Pj

Qk

Figure 18 and Table 8 show the risk index in Wuhan Port, which is calculated
according to the data available from 1999 to 2003. The trendline for these data can
be expressed as the formula: y = 1.4448x, on the basis of which, QK and Pk for the
next five years (2005 ~ 2009) can be estimated as shown in Table 8, assuming that

QK rises 2% per year from 2003.
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Risk index in Wuhan Port (1999 ~ 2003)
Pk
90
80

y = 1.4448x
R2 = 0.9151

70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

Qk ( X 10000)
60

Figure 18: Risk index in Wuhan Port (1999-2003)

Table 8: Weighted traffic volume and number of traffic accidents in Wuhan Port
year
Pk
4

QK ( X10 )

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

62

66

53

82

63.5

71.7

73.1

74.6

76.1

77.6

44.3671

45.3308

42.723

46.2745

47.6921 49.6189 50.6112

51.6235 52.6559 53.7091

3.2 Risk evaluation
Once the risk level has been estimated, its result will be evaluated in terms of risk
acceptance criteria in order to determine whether further measures should be taken to
reduce the estimated risk level to the level that stakeholders are satisfied with. In its
guideline, IALA (2000) states that:
The purpose of risk evaluation is to identify the distribution of risk, thus
allowing attention to be focused upon high-risk areas, and to identify and
evaluate the factors, which influence the level of risk. The risks, as estimated
in section B.2.1, are evaluated in terms of the needs, issues, and concerns of
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stakeholders, the benefits of the activity, and its costs. The result of this
exercise is a determination of the acceptability of these risks.

The current best practice is to recognize that there are three levels of risk in terms of
division of risk acceptability: intolerable, as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)
and negligible (IMO, 2002) :

• Intolerable — The risk is very high and cannot be justified except in
extraordinary circumstances so that measures have to be taken to reduce risk
level regardless of cost.

• Negligible — The risk has been made so small that neither further precaution
nor risk reduction is necessary.

• ALARP — The risk falls between the above two states. It is also called
Tolerable level, meaning that the risk is tolerable in this region. Risk reduction
measures may or may not be taken depending upon the cost-benefit analysis of
them. If the risk reduction measure is cost-effective, it should be taken to
reduce the risk as low as reasonably practicable, on the contrary, no action
needs to be taken to reduce the risk (Xie, 2001).
This concept can be illustrated in Figure 19 (IALA, 2000).
FREQUENCY

K1

Frequent

Intolerable
Reasonably
Probable

ALARP
Remote

Extremely
Remote

K2

Negligible
Insignificant

Minor

Major

Figure 19: ALARP Matrix
Source: IALA. (2000).
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Catastrophic

CONSEQUENCE

3.2.1 Stakeholders involved in planning VTS

In risk evaluation, the criteria of risk acceptability/tolerability depend on the needs,
issues and concerns of the stakeholders. Due to discrepancies in respect of social and
economic development, political system, administrative philosophy as well as public
awareness, different stakeholders may be involved in planning VTS in different
states, and even in a country, each stakeholder has its own rights, duties and
responsibilities, interests and value preference. So it is very tough to model these
needs, issues and concerns in a satisfactory way and in a uniform mode in terms of
the world.
With the rapid increase in coastal and ocean uses, as well as those inland activities
having effects on ocean and coastal environments, which can possibly conflict each
other, the establishment of VTS is not merely the business of the shipping industry
and maritime administration but also involves other parties such as fisheries,
mariculture, mining, offshore oil and tourism etc. because they could be the
beneficiaries or investors of VTS, or be affected by implementing VTS.
In the early 1990’s, a new concept of integrated coastal and ocean management
(ICOM) came into existence, which can be defined as a continuous and dynamic
process to ensure that the decisions of all sectors (e.g., fisheries, shipping, water
quality) and all levels of government are harmonized and consistent with the coastal
policies of the nations in question for the sustainable use, development, and
protection of coastal and marine areas and resources (Cincin-Sain & Knecht, 1998).
In this principle, decision makers for planning VTS should take into account four
aspects of integrations: intersectoral, intergovernmental, spatial and international in
order to develop an integrated criterion of risk acceptability for the planned area.
Intersectoral integration involves the harmonization of interests and solution of
conflicts between relevant marine sectors, coastal sectors and land-based sectors. For
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instance, establishing VTS can contribute to marine environmental protection which
is beneficial to fisheries, however fishing boats might have to be restricted by the
VTS rules. Spatial integration involves integration between ocean activities and landbased activities. They may influence or be dependent on each other and need to
achieve compatible goals and policies. Intergovernmental integration intends to deal
with those problems arising due to different roles, public needs and perspectives
among different levels of government (national, provincial, local) while the
international integration should take place when planning VTS involves multiple
states. VTS in the Malacca Strait is a good example of international integration,
which is an outcome of a three-state cooperation: Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.

3.2.2 Risk Perceptions

Theoretically, the stakeholders’ acceptability of risk can be expressed by a straight
line which crosses the two points K1 and K2 in the above ALARP Matrix. It is mainly
affected by risk perception. Royal Society Study Group (1992) states: “From the
perspective of the social sciences, risk perception involves people’s beliefs, attitudes,
judgements and feelings, as well as the wider social or cultural values and
dispositions that people adopt, towards hazards and their benefits.”
Different stakeholders have different risk perceptions. For example, in planning
VTS, the port authority may mainly focus on the influence on traffic efficiency by
bad visibility whereas tourism may emphasize the risks caused by marine pollution;
among the decision-maker team, technical experts are inclined to form their own
perception according to technical factors such as the probability of traffic accidents
and their impact on navigation safety and the marine environment while the public’s
perception of risk may be influenced by many things, including age, gender, region,
value, level of education, public opinion, time and previous serious hazards.
Therefore, it is necessary to create an integrated and accepted risk perception for all
the concerned stakeholders in order to determine the criterion of risk acceptability.
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Although it may not be suitable to achieve the criterion for planning for a VTS in
inflexible rules, as far as risk criteria for ships are concerned there are still some
principles that can be complied with:
(1) the activity should not impose any risks which can reasonably be avoided;
(2) the risks should not be disproportionate to the benefits;
(3) the risks should not be unduly concentrated on particular individuals;
(4) the risks of catastrophic accidents should be a small proportion of the total.
(Spouse 1997)

3.2.3 Evaluation of risk acceptability/tolerability
In the step of risk estimation, the risk state in a planned area can be described by the

risk index that includes two parameters QK and Pk. Both of them cannot be used
directly in the ALARP Matrix because its two axes respectively represent Frequency
and Consequence and the Matrix is especially appropriate to illustrate the risk level
that results from an accident or a category of accidents instead of an integrated risk

level that is reflected by all relevant accidents in a planned area and can be used in
planning VTS. So the ALARP Matrix needs to be transformed into a new model for
its application when planning for a VTS.
In the ALARP Matrix, the horizontal axis (Consequence) has the same implication
as the weighted number of traffic accidents (Pk) because Pk is calculated according
to two categories of scenarios: number of traffic accidents and their impacts. The
vertical axis (Frequency) has a close relationship with the weighted vessel traffic

volume (Qk): the more the traffic volume, the less the Frequency. Therefore, the
Matrix can be changed as shown in Figure 20:
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Pk

Intolerable

W2 (x2 , y2)
W3 (x3 , y3)

W1 (0, y1)

Trendline
(y = 1.4448x, in Wuhan Port case)

ALARP

Negligible
W4 (x4 , y4)

Qk

Figure 20: ALARP Matrix based on risk index

In Figure 20, the coordinates of Point W1 and W2 can be determined by the decisionmakers according to their risk perception. Point W2 means that once Pk is more than

y2 , the risk level in the planned area is absolutely intolerable no matter how much Qk
is. Point W4 means that once Pk is less than y4, the risk level in the planned area is
negligible no matter how little Qk is. The formula of the straight line crossing Point

W1 and W2 can be indicated as:
y =

y

2

− y1
• x + y1
x2

In the Wuhan Port case, its trendline could intersect with the straight line at Point

W3, the horizontal coordinate of which is calculated as: x3 = y1 x2 /(1.4448x2 + y1 -

y2). So, quantitatively, provided that the estimated Qk per year (2005 ~ 2009) in
Wuhan Port is above the value of x3, the risk level for the next five years will fall
into an intolerable degree theoretically, then the process of FSA will have to proceed
to Step 3 for specifying the risk control options.
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CHAPTER 4
Risk control options
In Chapter 3 a framework addressing risk analysis has been constructed, the ultimate
purpose of which is to determine whether or not the risks identified in Step 1 of FSA
will be accepted by stakeholders related to planning for a VTS. There will be one of
three types of outcome resulting from the above risk analysis exercise. If the decision
makers draw a conclusion that the risk level in a planned area is acceptable, then the
FSA process ends here and no further action is necessary other than reviewing the
risk level in the area periodically. If the risk level is considered intolerable, or it is
necessary to take cost-effective measures to reduce it although it is tolerable, the
FSA will initiate Step 3 — Risk Control Options (RCOs) to develop new risk
reduction measures. In its guidelines, IMO (2002) states that the purpose of Step 3 is
to propose effective and practical RCOs, which comprises the following four
principal stages:
.1 focusing on risk areas needing control;
.2 identifying potential risk control measures (RCMs);
.3 evaluating the effectiveness of the RCMs in reducing risk by re-evaluating
step 2; and
.4 grouping RCMs into practical regulatory options.

4.1 Areas needing control
When decision-makers plan for a VTS, the area that they are concerned with might
be so large that it is impossible or unnecessary to establish VTS covering the whole
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area due to the limitation of the resources and budgets. Therefore, the risk control
options must be given priority in the areas most needing risk control so that the
planned VTS can generate its functions to a greater extent and the risk level in whole
area can be improved more effectively.
In Step 1 of FSA, the whole water area studied can be geographically divided into
several sub-areas, and ranked according to the identified hazards or historical traffic
data. In Step 2, the risk indices in these sub-areas are also calculated respectively
and it is easily understood that the sub-area with a higher risk index has a higher risk
level. Generally, the outcome in the form of a prioritized list of sub-areas from these
two steps is consistent and the area most needing risk control can be obviously
identified. If the results conflict, the decision-makers have to make an assessment of
which sub-area has the highest priority at their discretion through comparing their
importance between the sub-area having the highest probability of accident
occurrence and the sub-area contributing to the highest severity outcomes.

4.2 Alternative risk control options
By reviewing the definition of risk and a pair of factors influencing the risk level,
risk control measures can be classified into two groups: preventive measures and
mitigating measures. Preventive measures are designed to reduce the likelihood of
failures and accidents, in short, control the frequency, whereas mitigating measures
aim at reducing the severity of failures and accidents, in short, controlling the
escalation of failures and accidents when they have happened (IMO, 1997).
Figure 21, created by Hahne & Galle (1993), illustrates how measures to safeguard
safety in shipping are categorized more in detail. There are wide means available to
the maritime industry for improving safety levels, for instance, from international
legislation to company management, from land based systems to ships’ design and
construction etc.
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As far as VTS is concerned, it is not only a kind of land based safety system but also
a method of doing waterways management. So when planning for a VTS, decisionmakers should specify the risk control options in the range of waterways
management instead of those broad-sense measures mentioned above.
In the planned area, reduction of the risk level may be achieved by implementing
waterways management that also can be divided into preventive measures and
mitigating measures. Preventive measures mainly refer to a land-based safety system
which includes passive systems and active systems. Passive systems are systems
where there is no action required to deliver the risk control measures and the
involved ships self-consciously comply with the requirements of systems, for
instance buoyancy, ship routing and traffic rules etc. Active systems are systems
where the risk control is provided by the action of safety facility or operators and the
involved ships receive the services or instructions from systems, such as ship
reporting, pilotage, VTS and so on. Mitigating measures are taken to reduce the
severity of the outcome of the event or subsequent events when they occur. Typical
examples are Search and Rescue (SAR), Contingency Plans, Places of Refuge,
Maritime Assistance Service, Particular Sensitivity Sea Area (PSSA) etc.
Although both kinds of measures can contribute to risk reduction, one is proactive
whereas the other is reactive. Proactive means the identification of factors at an early
stage that may adversely affect maritime safety and the immediate development of
regulatory action to prevent undesirable events, as opposed to just an after-the-fact
ad-hoc reaction to a single accident. Methodologies such as FSA are considered as
prime instruments for the development of proactive policies (Psaraftis, 2002).
When planning for a VTS, decision makers may confront two questions. Firstly,
those options in waterways management can be in favour of safety in a planned area
to some extent, however, which contributes most or is the most cost-effective?
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Secondly, is there one option which is adequate to reduce the risk to a level which
the stakeholders can be satisfied with or is it necessary to take a combined measure?
Compared with other options in the context of waterways management, VTS has its
distinctive advantages. VTS can play a role that overlaps with both preventive
measures and mitigating measures. Through providing the information and services
as well as monitoring the vessels’ movement, VTS results in the decline of accident
probability. Moreover, through attending the support of allied services or Search and
Rescue, VTS can contribute in blocking the escalation of accidents happening in the
VTS area. In particular, operators of VTS can remind crew on board of the coming
dangers or even give warning messages / instructions if necessary; VTS can also
ensure traffic safety and efficiency, especially in bad visibility etc. These functions
are exclusively offered by VTS rather than through other options in waterways
management.

Measures to safeguard safety in shipping

Measures to reduce risks

Land based
safety systems

Passive Systems
-Fairways
Active Systems
-VTS

On board
safety systems

-Alert systems
-Observation systems
-Communication systems
-Navigational systems

Measures to
influence
Subjective
behaviour

Measures to reduce consequences

Technical (naval
architectural) systems

Organizational
measures

IMO Conventions
-STCW
-COLREG
ISM Code

Economicalhumanitarian measures

Figure 21: Measures to ensure safety in shipping
Source: Hahne & Galle (1993)
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Passive Systems
-Structural fire protection
Active Systems
-Redundancy

-Response to leakage
-Hermetic sealing
-Fire fighting

-SAR
-Salvage
-Emergency repairs
-Replacement

Consequently, when applying FSA in the stage of planning for a VTS, decisionmakers should make clear three issues:
1. Suitability; is VTS able to reduce the risk level in the planned area
significantly?
2. Optimization; is it the most appropriate method or the first option?
3. Effectiveness; is it adequate or need it be complemented by other options?

4.3 Identifying risk control options
A structured review model ought to be created for identifying new risk control
options for risks that are not sufficiently suppressed by the existing measures. The
core part of this model is to find out the risk attributes and underlying factors of
accidents. Risk attributes relate to how a measure might control a risk and the prime
purpose of assigning attributes is to facilitate a structured thought process to
understand how a risk control option works, how it is applied and how it would
operate (IMO, 2002). Underlying factors relate to how and why accidents have
happened so that risk control can be introduced and stop them happening again.
In step 1 of FSA, collected historical traffic accident data has been used to categorize
and prioritize them and form a prioritized list of risks. Then aiming at different types
of accidents such as collision, grounding and contact etc., marine incident
investigation, with the incorporation of the human element, is respectively conducted
to uncover a group of underlying factors for each type of accident and prioritize these
factors according to their influence on system failure. The outcome is a prioritized
list of underlying factors for each type of accident in the planned area.
Commonly, different types of traffic accidents may have similar underlying factors.
For instance, collision, grounding and contact all might be caused by a crew’s lack of
a proper look-out or fatigue. So the next step when specifying RCOs is to combine
and prioritize those identified underlying factors into a list of factors, then put
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forward a relevant group of RCOs for each factor. For different factors, there might
be similar measures which can be taken to defend the system. For example, both
VTS and pilotage services can counteract the influence of a crew’s lack of a proper
look-out or fatigue to some extent. Eventually, all specified RCOs in all groups are
combined into a list of RCOs. This list includes the suggested options that cover all
the identified underlying factors. The above principle for specifying risk control
options is illustrated, as shown in Figure 22.
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Historical traffic accident data
Categorization / Prioritization

Type A

Type B

••••••••
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Marine accident investigation

Underlying
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type A
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Underlying
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••••••
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Prioritization

Prioritization

Prioritization

••••••

Prioritization

Factor A1

Factor B1

Factor C1

Factor µ1

Factor A2

Factor B2

Factor C2

Factor µ2

Factor A3

Factor B3
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•
•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•

Factor An

Factor Bn

Factor Cn

••••••

Factor µ3

•
•
•
Factor µn

Combination / Prioritization
Factor 1

Factor 2

RCO group 1

Factor 3

RCO group 2

RCO group 3

••••••
••••••

Combination

RCO 1

RCO 2

RCO 3

RCO 4

Figure 22: Specify risk control options
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•••••

RCO m

Factor n

RCO group n

4.4 Marine incident investigation
Under IMO conventions each flag State has a duty to conduct an investigation into
any casualty occurring to any of its ships when it judges that such an investigation
may assist in determining what changes in the present regulations may be desirable
while under UNCLOS where a casualty occurs within the territorial sea or internal
waters of a State, that State has a right to investigate the cause of any such casualty
which might pose a risk to life or the environment, involve the coastal State’s SAR
authorities, or otherwise affect the coastal State (IMO, 1997). From this point of
view, marine incident investigation may assist in determining whether the
establishment of a VTS is justified in the planned area. In the context of waterways
management, the objective of the investigation is to prevent similar accidents in the
future through adopting appropriate risk control options for waterways management.
Needless to say, the human element plays an important role in the origin of
accidents, and it is commonly thought that about eighty percent of transport accidents
involve the human element while even some specialists claim that all accidents
involve the human factor ultimately. Consequently, human element issues should be
systematically incorporated into the FSA framework, associating them directly with
the occurrence of incidents and underlying causes.
In 1997, IMO adopted the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and
Incidents. The Code was amended in 1999 to provide practical advice for systematic
investigation of human factors in marine casualties and incidents. This instrument
can be used by decision makers when planning VTS to develop an applicable
framework to identify all the possible underlying factors leading to accidents in
planned areas so that corresponding risk control options can be figured out logically.

• SHEL model
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The SHEL Model was originally developed by Edwards and modified later by
Hawkins. It has been considered to be a useful means of defining information
requirements during an occurrence investigation. Once the information requirements
are identified, the investigator can gather the facts from appropriate sources (IMO,
2000). There are four components to the model: Liveware, Hardware, Software and
Environment.
The SHEL Model is commonly depicted graphically to display, not only the four
components, but also the relationships, or interfaces, between the Liveware and all
the other components. A mismatch of the interface can be a source of human error
and identification of a mismatch may be the identification of a safety deficiency in
the system (IMO, 1999).
In planning VTS, the purpose of the SHEL model is to assist decision-makers to
understand the types of human interaction with environment where a person is
working. It helps to get information concerning “what, where, when and who
happened” and identify influencing factors on each type of interfacing rather than
explaining how or why accidents have occurred.
In 2002, Kawano created the m-SHEL model, as shown in Figure 23, that is a
variation of the SHEL model and adds "m- (management)", which represents the
control of whole system, to the SHEL model. In their article, Itoh & Mitomo apply
the m-SHEL model for analysis of human factors at ship operation. They highlighted
the interface between liveware and management, which involved four aspects: duties
of employers and captains, duties of politics, hand skills on to the next generation as
well as accumulation, analysis, and sharing of experiences (Itoh & Mitomo, 2004). In
planning VTS, this model should be taken into account so that decision-makers can
be aware of the interface between crew on board and existing land based safety
system.
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Figure 23: m-SHEL model
Source: Itoh & Mitomo. (2004).

• Reason Model
Although there are many different accident causation theories in use, the one which
has been used most extensively is that of James Reason, based on the theories by
Rasmussen et al. In order to analyse the causes of accidents, a theoretical framework
that can be applied to events is needed. This framework can provide a theoretical
basis for both the understanding of the causes of accidents and for the invention of
practical remedial actions. For this framework to have credibility, it must lead to the
improved remediation or prevention of incidents (Gordon & Mearns, 2000). Maurino

et al (1995) states that all technological systems have the following common
processes: organisational processes, local working conditions and defences, barriers
and safeguards.
Reason’s model, utilizing a production framework and facilitating further
organization of the data collected by using the SHEL model, can be used by an
investigator as a guide to developing an occurrence sequence in the way of arranging
the information regarding the occurrence of events and circumstances around one of
five production elements, i.e., decision makers, line management, preconditions,
productive activities, and defense (IMO, 1999). On the basis of the Reason Model, a
new one can be conceived to be applied when planning for a VTS. This should help
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the decision-makers highlight the deficiencies and insufficiencies in waterways
management in order to figure out new risk control options. This model is illustrated
in Figure 24.

Environment

Crew
deficiencies

Preconditions
Psychological
precursors of
unsafe acts

Productive
activities
Unsafe acts

Defences
Waterways
management
Inadequate

Accident
occurence

Figure 24: Model for highlighting the deficiencies and insufficiency
in waterways management
Source: Based on the Reason Model. (1999).

The principle of this model is that the whole system could be protected by defences
(waterways management) and feedback loops from all system levels safeguarding the
safety of the system. Human deficiencies result from the environment where one is
working, and psychological precursors of unsafe acts (fatigue, stress etc.) in
combination with the unsafe act lead to a limited window of accident opportunity,
which might trigger an accident, if adequate waterways management is unavailable.
The following case elaborates this theory.
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On a night during the 1970’s, a passenger ferry sunk in Japanese coastal waters after
hitting a rock causing a serious fatality. The investigation report showed that the
primary cause was the crew’s lack of a valid look-out and recommended reminding
crews of navigating cautiously in that area. Unfortunately, ten years later a similar
casualty occurred again. The investigation indicated that in the first several years
after the previous accident, the crew really operated with vigilance in that area.
However in the course of time, the lesson from this incident was neglected
unconsciously by seafarers and a similar cause led to similar accident once more.
Later a lighthouse was installed on the rock and this kind of incident has not occurred
since. An application of the model on this case for specifying risk control options is
illustrated in Figure 25:
Environment:
At night
(Darkness)

Crew
deficiencies:
Unable to see
the rock

Preconditions
Psychological
precursors:
Overconfidence /
careless

Productive
activities
Unsafe acts:
Error on
fixing position

Accident
occurrence

Overcome the darkness through showing where the rock is

Highlight the danger
At night
(Darkness)

Unable to
see the rock

Overconfidence /
careless

Error on
fixing position

Lighthouse
(Defence)

Accident
blocked

Alert crew that ship is approach the rock
Crew can find the rock by seeing the lighthouse

Figure 25: Model of a passenger ferry accident
From the above example, it can be concluded that the installation of a lighthouse
could contribute to protecting the system at all levels. So a lighthouse should be
considered as an identified risk control option. Similarly, VTS could also play an
important role to prevent such accidents from happening in this respect.
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The above model is an accident causation model while SHEL is a model that simply
explains the types of human interaction without putting them into a context. In this
step of FSA, these two models should be complementary to each other in order to
facilitate decision-makers in finding out the appropriate risk control options for a
planned area.
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CHAPTER 5
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and recommendations for decision-making
In the previous chapter, Step 3 implies the development of Risk Control Options,
which contain a limited number of Risk Control Measures (RCMs) for particular risk
scenarios ranked by importance. These RCOs could be designed either to control the
likelihood of initiation of accidents or control the escalation of accidents. The scope
of Step 3 is a set of RCOs assessed according to their effectiveness of reducing risk
(Melendez, 2004). Hereafter, FSA will activate its Step 4 – Cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) to find the relation between the cost of the implementation of a RCO and the
benefit obtained in terms of risk reduction.
There are two major kinds of cost-benefit analysis and they are Ex ante CBA and Ex

post CBA. In the process of FSA, the applied CBA commonly refers to the former,
which is conducted while a project or policy is under consideration or before it is
started or implemented. On the contrary, the latter is done at the end of a project. Ex

ante CBA assists in making the decision about whether scarce resources should be
allocated by stakeholders to a specific project or policy and how to facilitate more
efficient allocation (Boardman & Greenberg, 2001).
A VTS system is expensive to build and operate. It is necessary to conduct an
extensive CBA to justify such large public and/or private investments. In its VTS
Manual, IALA (2002) states that:
Even if not all costs and benefits can be translated into monetary terms the
CBA can assist in a more complete and rational decision-making process. It
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can also contribute to the proper allocation of the cost recovery by the various
benefiting parties, as well as the determination of the system requirements.
Such a CBA forms an integral and essential part of the whole process for the
application of FSA on planning VTS.
In the last step, several risk control options may have been specified. The CBA
would ensure the balance among these risk control options. The principle is that if
the cost of a RCO outweighs its benefit, the improved safety or the reduced risk that
such a “cost” achieves, this RCO is not regarded as cost-effective, then it will be
rejected unless the local risk level is considered intolerable.
In its guidelines, IMO (2002) recommends the procedures for conducting a CBA,
which may consist of the following stages:
1. consider the risks assessed in step 2, both in terms of frequency and
consequence, in order to define the base case in terms of risk levels of the
situation under consideration;
2. arrange the RCOs, defined in step 3, in the way to facilitate understanding of
the costs and benefits resulting from the adoption of an RCO;
3. estimate the pertinent costs and benefits for all RCOs;
4. estimate and compare the cost effectiveness of each option, in terms of the
cost per unit risk reduction by dividing the net cost by the risk reduction
achieved as a result of implementing the option; and
5. rank the RCOs from a cost-benefit perspective in order to facilitate the
decision-making recommendations in step 5.
This proposal may be used to develop a framework of conducting a CBA for
planning for a VTS in order to determine whether the establishment of VTS in a
planned area is justified or is the most cost-effective option among all the RCOs
specified in the previous step. The following is a method which elaborates how to
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implement VTS CBA, provided that VTS is one of the RCOs. This method may, in
principle, also be applied on the CBA of other RCOs.

5.1 Definition of interested parties
The interested parties in this case can be defined as those who are directly or
indirectly impacted by the existing risks or new risks generated by establishing VTS
and those who intend to invest in a VTS or will benefit from the VTS. It is often
contentious whether CBA should be conducted from an international, national, local
or Maritime Administration perspective. In general, this poser may be solved
according to the location and scale of the planned VTS, national maritime policy and
administrative philosophy. When measuring the cost and benefit of a VTS, analysts
may divide these interested parties into several groups and those in the same group
may have common interests as far as the implementation of VTS in planned area is
concerned.

5.2 Catalogue the impacts of VTS and determine measurement units
For a proposed RCO, its impacts can be classified as the anticipated beneficial
impacts and the anticipated cost impacts. For a planned VTS, the anticipated
beneficial impacts mainly include the time saved and reduced shipping costs for
ships participating in a VTS (improvement of traffic efficiency); the residual value
after the discounting period of 10 ~ 20 years; accidents avoided due to implementing
VTS. The anticipated cost impacts are VTS construction costs and its additional
maintenance and operational costs. All these impacts of VTS could be listed as
benefits or costs in order to facilitate their measurement in the CBA.
The risk reduction of implementing VTS can be calculated relative to the present
safety level. In a previous step, the safety level in a planned area is expressed as the

expected annual weighted number of traffic accidents Pk. The risk reduction
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resulting from VTS can thus be expressed as the number of averted Pk if the option
is implemented.
The initial cost and its maintenance and the operating costs of VTS are estimated. By
comparing all costs to the number of averted Pk , the costs of averting a standard

weighted traffic accident can be computed. This number represents the cost-benefit
of the planned VTS. When the costs of averting a standard weighted traffic accident
have been calculated for all specified RCOs, decision-makers can possibly highlight
an option which has the largest risk reduction for a certain amount spent.

5.3 Predict the costs of VTS
The objective of predicting the costs of VTS is to estimate the costs associated with
implementing and operating the planned VTS. In its Manual, IALA (2002) sets out a
framework for determining of the VTS costs:
The cost components of a new VTS consist of two distinctive groups, namely
the initial investment costs and the lifetime operating costs. Not only the costs
for the VTS-organization need to be taken into consideration, but also the
costs incurred by other parties. Often allied organizations and users need to
invest to supply to or obtain information from VTS. All cost components
should be identified and quantified, both in size (how much?) and time
(when?). At the end of the lifetime of the VTS the investments might still
have a residual value which needs to be deducted from the initial investment.

The estimates can be based on literature surveys and experience from other VTSs
which have been established where a large similarity exists between them and the
planned VTS in terms of scale, type, the services provided, the functions performed
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and location etc. Table 9 shows those items that should be taken into account and can
be used in estimating the costs of the planned VTS.
Table 9: VTS costs calculation
VTS costs

cost items ( currency unit)

VTS 1

VTS 2 VTS 3 · · · · · · · VTS n average costs

research
feasibility study

initial investment 1

tendering

(planning phase)

procurement
legislation
design
other costs
land acquisition
building works
equipment purchase

initial investment 2

equipment installation

(construction)

spares purchase
recruitment of staff
training if staff
developing procedures
project management
other costs
maintenance and repairing of the building works
maintenance and repairing of the equipment

operating costs

salaries

(operational phase)

on-going training

per year

consumables
up-to-date equipment
other costs

After the initial investment costs (Ci) and annual operating costs (Co) for a planned
VTS are estimated, the total costs in the lifetime of the investment (Ct) can be
expressed using the following formula:

Ct = Ci + Co × n − CR
n: the expected lifetime of the planned VTS (generally 10 ~ 20 years);
CR: the expected residual value of the planned VTS after n years.
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Due to the influence of interest rates, for more objectively evaluating the VTS costs,
facilitating comparison of costs and benefits as well as treating all costs, whether
incurred early or late in the whole lifetime of VTS, in an equitable manner, it is
necessary to discount the above Ct to a fixed point in time, generally the assumed
starting point of the project, then the discounted value of all costs during the lifetime
of a VTS can be calculated as follows:

Ct = [ Ci / (1 + k ) y ] + [ Co (( 1 + k) n − 1 ) / k ( 1+ k ) n ] − [ CR / ( 1 + k ) n ]
with:

k: interest rate
y: the expected building years of planned VTS

5.4 Risk reduction factor
The risk reduction factor can be defined as the expected weighted number of

traffic accidents Pk after implementation of the VTS, divided by the estimated Pk
without implementation of the VTS. Undoubtedly, this factor will lie between 0 and
1. It is not possible to precisely measure this factor because of the impossibility of
considering the same area and time period with and without the VTS. Therefore,
assessment of risk reduction factors can be based on an analysis of the operational
modes of the planned VTS, including its type, the services provided and the
functions performed as well as on literature surveys and calculations (DMA, 2002).
In its VTS Manual, IALA (2002) recommends four categories of approaches that can
be used to assess the risk reduction factor for the discussed VTS: statistical
evaluation of the existing situations and experiences (also elsewhere); consultation of
experienced mariners, VTS-staff and consultants; mathematical models and
simulation methods.
The first two can be conducted easily, inexpensively and without requiring detailed
information, but the subjective judgement and historical data statistics, however they
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may achieve a result having a big deviation from the actual performance of a planned
VTS due to different situations and scenarios. These assessments are mainly
implemented in forms of literature surveys and questionnaire. For instance,
Glansdorp (2005) made studies in Dutch ports and drew the conclusion that VTSs in
Netherlands contribute to a risk reduction in the VTS areas by nearly 30%; some
research indicates that a full VTS can reduce accidents in areas of high traffic density
by 50% (IALA, 2002); Harrald & Merrick (2000) assessed risk reduction due to
VTM (vessel traffic management) through consulting two expert panels consisting of
8 licensed merchant mariners, 7 Coast Guard officers and 12 persons with knowledge
of port operations, and concluded the overall ranking of the alternatives on a relative
scale in risk reduction for the Norfolk/Hampton Roads area, as shown in Figure 26.
These kinds of research outcomes and individual opinion can be used for reference
by decision-makers in order to estimate the benefits of a planned VTS.

Figure 26: Ranking of alternatives in risk reduction for Norfolk/Hampton Roads area
Source: Harrald & Merrick. (2000).

While the last two approaches have more objectivity and allow different individuals
to offer generally more uniform assessment, they have to be done much more costly
or complicatedly and their accuracy depends on whether the models that they use are
accessible enough to reality. In some circumstances, even they may not be as reliable
as the first two approaches, because, after all, the models cannot cover all influencing
factors and correspond with reality perfectly. In other words, each suggested method
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has its own advantages and disadvantages and a combination of them may be
necessary, depending on the situation.

5.5 Expected costs per averted weighted traffic accident for VTS
In step 2 of FSA, the traffic risk state in an area is expressed by its risk index, which
is the ratio of weighted number of traffic accidents Pk and weighted vessel traffic

volume Qk in the area in a period. Then a trendline is developed in order to estimate
the future risk index for the area. In addition, the expected future Qk can be
predicted through analysing the future economic and trade development. Therefore,

the expected total Pk in the lifetime of VTS without implementing any risk control
option (P0) can be calculated according to the above outcomes. Assuming that the
risk reduction factor for VTS is f, the expected total averted Pk in the lifetime of
VTS due to implementing VTS (Pw) can be calculated as the following formula:

Pw = P0 ( 1− f )
So the expected costs per averted Pk for VTS (RCO 1) can be calculated as:

Cper 1 = Ct / Pw = Ct / P0 ( 1− f )
A significant item when calculating the expected costs per averted Pk for VTS lies
in the question, which specified RCO is the most cost-effective. This can be
answered through a comparison with those expected costs per averted Pk for other
RCOs. Generally, the RCO with the lowest expected costs per averted Pk is the most
cost-effective and is considered worth giving the highest adoption priority.
For instance, when doing a risk analysis of navigational safety in Danish waters, the
DMA (2002) computed the costs per averted spill oil for all identified RCOs. These
RCOs were then ranked according to their cost-effectiveness, as shown in Figure 27.
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Costs per averted spill

RCOs

Figure 27: Costs per averted spill for all RCOs in situation 2001 and 2008 in Danish waters
Source: DMA. (2002).

It is evident that the four most beneficial RCOs are Wider Drogden channel, Hatter
area incorporated into VTS Great Belt, Dredging in Hatter main route and VTS
Drogden. They would be the most attractive choices to the decision-makers.

5.6 Estimate the benefits of VTS
The risk reduction benefits that would be derived from implementing VTS and
costed in the above step need to be estimated now. Nevertheless, directly predicting
the benefits of VTS is probably the most difficult and problematic task in the entire
process of FSA. To simplify the method of predicting the benefits of the future VTS,
it is necessary to develop an indirect approach.
In fact, all predictions are based on previous experience. The benefits of VTS can be
comprehended as the costs of averted accidents which would be prevented because
of adoption of the VTS. It can be assumed that the costs of per averted weighted

accident equal to the costs of per occurred weighted accident in past years, which
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can be calculated through dealing with historical accident data. So a thorny job
(directly predicting the benefits of VTS) is translated into a relatively easy one
(calculating the costs of occurred accidents in history).

• Loss of life or injured
Estimating the monetary worth of a human life is a sensitive issue, considering that
occasionally, people are injured or die as a result of an accident. For the purpose of
CBA, the value of a human life is inherently an estimate, one that is pondered upon
regularly (IALA, 2002).
Researchers have used several benefit estimation techniques to estimate the value of
life. These techniques either indirectly estimate the “price” people must be paid to be
willing to take, or accept, certain risks by observing their behaviour in markets for
commodities that embody risks, or directly elicit these amounts with hypothetical
survey questions (Boardman & Greenberg, 2001). Many experts and scholars create
their own model for elaborating and discussing this issue.
For instance, Miller, Fisher, Chestnut and Violette etc. (1999) estimate the value of
life and injury costs in the United States through examining how much of a wage
premium people working in risky jobs must be given to compensate them for the
additional risks (Boardman & Greenberg, 2001). Figure 28 illustrates their research
outcomes.
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Figure 28: Value of life and monetary injury costs
Source: Miller, Fisher, Chestnut and Violette etc. (1999) / Boardman & Greenberg. (2001).

Mishan (1988) put forward a formula for calculating the economic worth of a
person’s life (L) on the basis of discounting the person’s expected future earnings to
the present, where Yt is the expected gross earnings of the person during the tth year,
exclusive of any yields from his ownership of non-human capital. Ptτ is the
probability in the current, or τth, year of the person being alive during the tth year, and

r is the social rate of discount expected to rule during the tth year.
∞

L = ∑ Yt Pτt (1 + r )
t =τ
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− ( t −τ )

In his lecture, Friis-Hansen (2005) also estimated the socio-economical value of
human life (Q) using the Life Quality Index, which combines gross national product
per capita (G), life expectancy at birth (E) and working time (W): Q = G W E 1−W .

Besides the above models, there are also a lot of other methods available to measure
the monetary worth of a human life. Decision-makers can select an appropriate one
at their discretion.

• Economic losses
Economic losses can be divided into two groups, hard losses and soft losses. The
former mainly includes those obvious, tangible and direct losses of or damage to
properties, caused by accidents, and relevant repair and replacement costs. They can
be measured relatively easily through reviewing the historical accident data.
The latter mainly includes those associated indirect costs that may not be readily
recognized, for example loss of earnings, loss of reputation, loss resulting from delay
in the carriage by sea of cargo, passengers or their luggage, loss resulting from
“down time” of both vessels and related shore based activities due to fog and other
circumstances etc. These so-called soft losses should also be considered and
translated into monetary terms. However, some factors are almost impossible to
translate into monetary terms precisely, whereas they should at least be noted and
mentioned in the outcome of the CBA so that decision-makers can make a more
comprehensive analysis with these references (IALA, 2002).

• Environmental pollution
Similarly the costs of environmental pollution can be divided into two groups as
well, tangible and intangible costs. The tangible costs include the direct costs of the
accidents, costs of the Search-and-Rescue operation, those associated costs for clean-
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up operations including shoreline clean-up and recovery of sunken oil, all arising
from the occurred accident. These costs can be calculated easily through reviewing
the historical data and records.
The intangible costs mainly include damage to public and ecological resources, the
impact on the ecosystem and human health, the damage to public recreation areas
and sustainable development, influence on the fishery industry, aquaculture and
tourism, political costs etc. Some of these can be translated into monetary terms
while others are almost impossible to be measured in monetary terms, so they should
at least be noted and mentioned in the outcome of the CBA so that the decisionmakers can make a more comprehensive analysis with these references.

5.7 Assessment of the worthiness for VTS
From the above steps, the costs of accidents during the past years can be calculated,
and then these costs are discounted to a fixed point in time, generally the assumed
starting point of the project, in a manner similar to that of calculating the costs of
VTS. If the outcome is divided by historical weighted number of traffic accidents

Pk, then the costs of per occurred Pk will be achieved.
Assessing the worthiness for a planned VTS can be made by comparing the costs of

per occurred Pk to the expected costs per averted Pk. This knowledge is used
together with political and other considerations to determine whether or not the
planned VTS should be implemented (DMA, 2002).
As a general principle, a VTS should be implemented if the expected costs per

averted Pk are lower than the costs of per occurred Pk.
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5.8 Recommendations for decision-making
Output from the above steps can provide an objective answer for the question of
whether the establishment of a VTS in a planned area is justified or worthwhile and
how much its cost-effectiveness is. Similarly, the above principles and methods are
also applicable to CBA of other identified RCOs. A comparison of their results can
indicate which is the most cost-effective option among all RCOs. This facilitates and
rationalizes the decision-making, and could be easily used by decision-makers
without a requirement for specialist expertise.
In the final step of FSA, recommendations for decision-making that interacts with
each of the other steps of FSA, recommendations should be presented in a form
which can be understood by all parties irrespective of their experience in the
application of risk and cost benefit assessment and related techniques. Those
submitting the results of an FSA process should provide timely and open access to
relevant supporting documents and a reasonable opportunity for, and a mechanism
to, incorporate comments (IMO, 2002).
Generally, the recommendations are based upon the outcomes of previous steps: in
Step 1, the comparison and ranking of all risks, hazards and sub-areas in the planned
area; in Step 2, estimated Pk, Qk and risk indices for each sub-area as well as their
risk acceptability; in Step 3, the ranking of the underlying causes of those identified
risks and hazards in Step 1 and the corresponding specified risk control options; in
Step 4, the comparison and ranking of RCOs as a function of associated costs and
benefits. Additionally, decision-makers must always be aware of residual risk, which
is defined as any risk left after the implementation of the designated risk control
option(s), and if appropriate, loop back in the process to determine if it should be
further reduced, as shown Figure 3.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
The main purpose of this dissertation is the introduction of RBDM techniques
commonly used for planning VTS to evaluate whether establishing a VTS in a
planned area is justified and cost-effective. This analysis requires a clear
understanding of all the factors that the application of RBDM on planning VTS
involves and the development of a RBDM framework based on these factors. This
RBDM framework, the so-called FSA, serves as an adequate reference for the
application of RBDM techniques on planning for a VTS.
Traditional approaches to decision-making have been partly successful and RBDM
should be introduced in order to more greatly contribute to the improvement of safety
in maritime sectors. RBDM is a systematic and scientific process of making
decisions. FSA is a practical framework of the application of RBDM in the maritime
industry, which is constructed using several mutually related modules: the
identification of risks and hazards, risk assessment, the specification of RCOs, CBA
and recommendations. As a framework of proactive approaches, FSA is considered
as a prime instrument for the development of proactive marine policies.
The above chapters introduce some of the main concepts to be used in the process of
doing a FSA when planning for a VTS. Firstly, the problems needing to be defined
for establishing a VTS were highlighted and it was shown that they are mainly
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related to six aspects: VTS vessels, types of VTS, traffic rules and regulations, risk to
be considered, geographical boundaries and determination of risk, then the risks and
hazards in the planned area were identified and ranked through analysing the
historical traffic accident records and local traffic data.
Secondly, after some models recommended by IMO for risk analysis and the
limitation of their application on planning VTS had been briefly introduced, a new
method based on the risk index theory of Wu was demonstrated. This method can be
used to estimate the future weighted traffic volume and traffic accident loss. Then, a
new model evolving from the traditional ALARP Matrix was introduced illustrating
the risk acceptability using two parameters, traffic volume and traffic accident loss,
instead of risk frequency and consequence.
Thirdly, in specifying RCOs, the m-SHEL model developed from the SHEL model
and a new model based on the Reason model were used. Their combination and
mutual supplementation highlight the relevant RCOs, which are identified according
to the underlying factors of traffic accidents, in the context of waterways
management.
Finally, the concept of cost-benefit analysis was presented through a prioritisation of
the RCOs with respect to cost-effectiveness and the subjective criterion, which is a
comparison of the costs per averted spill to the costs of the occurrence of a spill, for
the determination of whether to implement an RCO.
Based on the above concepts and analyses, some recommendations are then
submitted to the decision-makers. Thus, a whole process of how to apply FSA when
planning for a VTS was demonstrated. Each major project may be regarded as
unique. Therefore, the detailed application of RBDM on planning for a VTS is
definitely different from other maritime projects although the principles of RBDM
are applicable and identical to all fields. Even, within various VTS projects, there are

91

many aspects which differ. However, the similarity on the principles, methods and
purposes of planning and implementing each VTS means that it is possible and
necessary to create a generally applicable methodology for RBDM when planning
VTS. This dissertation presents a uniform scheme illustrating how to apply RBDM
when planning for a VTS.

6.2 Recommendations
The real scale of VTSs, as well as the cost of their investment and operation, have
expanded dramatically in recent decades. Such a large and expensive project indeed
needs to be assessed with RBDM in order to determine whether or not it is justified.
The RBDM approach presented in this thesis provides some other benefits which
may prove far more important in the long term. These benefits include:
• A more transparent process in decision-making, which can help the stakeholders
to understand the necessity for the suggested risk control option(s) and
determine whether to establish a VTS in the planned area.
• Better and more definite risk perceptions that determine the risk criteria and
acceptability, as well as their effects on planning for a VTS.
• Through identifying the underlying factors of risk with the incorporation of the
human element, safeguards could be proactively taken in order to prevent
accidents from occurring; this facilitates the assessment of the appropriate mix
of ways to reduce risk.
• Documentation and integration of group knowledge which is usually composed
of individual opinions and permits their reservation.
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• Soundness testing of the assumptions in the future performance scenario of the
planned VTS.
• Feedback into the decision-making process in terms of the suggested ways of
preventing or avoiding risks in the planned area.
Taking into account the promotion of the application of RBDM when planning for a
VTS, the author would like to propose the following recommendations:
• Decision-makers must understand the limitation of risk-based decision-making,
which is still a developing science. The uncertainty is inherent in the process of
RBDM, which is a major limitation of this approach and affects people’s
confidence in this approach.
• RBDM mainly provides relevant information, associated analysis outcomes and
recommendations instead of the defined solutions to risks and hazards.
• Limited resources should be directed to the most severe risks in a cost-effective
manner in order to create the maximum benefits.
• Each suggested RCO should be based on a scientifically and technically credible
risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis.
• Each public agency that administers projects relating to navigational safety,
marine environmental protection and traffic efficiency should undertake to
establish regulatory and budgetary priorities to guarantee that the national
resources are appropriately allocated.
• It is necessary to develop standard procedures and models, which should be as
uniform as possible, for the conduct of RBDM when planning for a VTS.
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• Risk control options should be evaluated in terms of cost, benefits, residual
risks, risk reduction factor as well as the associated uncertainties in data and
methods used to assess risks.
• Decision-makers must also be aware that the future is not a simple and linear
extension of the existing situation, so more refined methods must be applied to
assess the estimated risks including their consequences, for the upcoming years
by taking into account all the foreseeable trends.
• Ranking the RCOs with respect to cost-effectiveness presents a recommended
implementation sequence if cost-effectiveness were the only criterion. There are,
however, other criteria which affect the final choice of RCO, for instance
political objectives, co-funding of measures with other interested parties,
consideration of natural resources, flora and fauna, professional and industrial
bodies and the public. They may also have an impact on the preferences of the
decision-makers.
• It is necessary to foster more advanced methodologies for assessing risks and
mitigating the uncertainties of analysis, more enhanced information and data
collection to improve the accuracy and relevancy of RBDM, and innovative risk
control options to reduce risks to safety and the environment while increasing
traffic efficiency to a greater extent.
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Appendix A
Port Of Wuhan: a brief view
Wuhan port, the second largest inland port in China, has the capability of handling
over 30 million tons of cargo each year (Hubei Government, 2000). As a first-grade
port open to the outside world, it serves not only the international sea-borne trade of
the country with many boat lines leading directly to 14 countries and regions such as
Russia, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau, but is also at the centre of Yangtze
river shipping and the key pivotal point of transportation which greatly contributes to
the establishment of logistics between the central-western parts of China and Chinese
coastal areas. According to the statistical data, the annual freight volume of Wuhan
Port is 24.32 million tons with an annual passenger-traffic volume of 5.55million
passengers (Gotravel, 2005).

Location
The geographical position of Wuhan Port is 30°-33'N and 114°-19'E. The port is
attached to Wuhan City with more than 8 million inhabitants, located in the middle
of China - about 1,200kms from Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong. The
city is the provincial capital of Hubei Province and a focal point for political,
economic, scientific and cultural affairs for central China.
The harbour area covers 122.45 square kms, including a land area of 1.75 square
kms, while its water area is composed of the Yangtze river section (the southern bank
of 140kms from Bangzhou Tou to Sanjiang Kou and the northern bank of 188kms
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from Shuihong Kou to Bahe Kou) and the Hanjiang river section of 55kms from
Xingou to the Hanjiang Estuary where the Hangjiang river, as a tributary of the
Yangtze river, converges into it within the Yangtze river section of Wuhan Port.

Harbour Facility
Due to its unique geographical advantage, Wuhan has been known since ancient
times for its thoroughfares and golden rivers leading to different regions inside China
and to various countries around the world. With 615 docking berths, Wuhan Port is
one of the biggest passenger and cargo ports along the Yangtze River. Passenger
traffic at Wuhan Port ranks first among all inland river ports in the Yangtze Basin
and its cargo traffic ranks third in volume, behind Shanghai and Nanjing. All-year
round, 5,000 ton-vessels can use the port while 10,000 ton-vessels can berth
alongside during the wet season (Jipin, 2005).
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Appendix B
Identification of risks and hazards in Wuhan Port
1. The traffic volume per year (1999-2003) in Wuhan port and its distribution
According to Formula 3, the traffic volume per year (1999-2003) in Wuhan port is
estimated as 234904 while the volume per day is 643. With consideration to traffic
properties in the dry and flood seasons and the local natural conditions, the visual
surveys were undertaken continuously for four days respectively in May and
November (1999-2003). The site was located in Wharf.22, on the opposite side of the
river of which, a chimney in Guomiansi factory was selected as the reference target
so that an observation line was kept vertical with the main traffic flow in the Yangtze
River. The collected data consists of vessel classes, vessel sizes, going upstream or
sailing downstream and the time when the vessel passed through the observation line.
In addition, the internal traffic volume was obtained through investigating Wuhan
Maritime Safety Administration records.
Figures 29 and 30 describe the distribution of vessel sizes and classes in Wuhan port.
They show that ships ranging from 30m to 75m in terms of length form the principal
part of the traffic flow and possess 63.77 percent of the total volume. Vessels
identified in visual surveys and records were categorised into eleven classes for the
purpose of analysis and four main types including cargo ship, barge-fleet pushed by
tug, working ship and ferry, contribute to 79 percent of all vessels.
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distribution of vessel sizes in Wuhan port
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Figure 29: Distribution of vessel sizes in Wuhan Port (visual surveys, 1999-2003)
Source: Yangtze Maritime Safety Administration (2005).

distribution of vessel classes in Wuhan port
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Figure 30: Distribution of vessel classes in Wuhan Port (visual surveys and MSA
records, 1999-2003)
Source: Yangtze Maritime Safety Administration (2005).
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2. Main mix of traffic in Wuhan Port
Wuhan Port is situated in the centre part of the Yangtze waters network comprising
the main river and tributaries. Due to complicated geographical features and special
traffic rules, there exists a large amount of altering course points and crossing traffic
flows in the whole area. The main mixes of traffic in Wuhan Port occur in sailing
cross areas and where ferry services are provided. As the above mentioned, sailing
cross areas increase the probability of ship cross encounters and collisions. In its
investigation report, Changjiang MSA (2004) states that about seventy percent of
total collisions in the Anhui section of the Yangtze River in two recent years are
related to sailing cross areas. Thus decision-makers should consider reducing the
number of such areas to a level as little as practicable or take measures to control and
monitor the traffic flows in those areas. Besides six sailing cross areas, Wuhan Port
has eighteen ferry lines that include thirteen for passengers and five for automobiles,
connecting the two sides of the Yangtze River and the Hanjiang River. The total
number of main traffic mixes in Wuhan Port can be approximately calculated as
follows: 18 x 3 + 6 = 60.

3. A short introduction to visibility, current and wind in Wuhan Port

The mean number of foggy days per year in Wuhan Port in the most recent five years
is 33.1 days, ten of which happen most frequently in November. Commonly, fog
forms in the morning and clears off by noon in the spring and winter. When fog is
very thick above the surface of river, ferry services and other waterborne traffic will
be suspended temporarily.
Wuhan Port is predominated by East and South winds in spring and summer whereas
West and North winds prevail in autumn and winter. The average wind speed is 2.8
m/s and the wind force generally ranges from Beaufort Force (BF) 2 to 4 a year. The
maximum wind speed in a year is commonly 19.1 m/s and an extreme 28 m/s of
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strong gale was recorded once. There are on average 8.2 days for wind of BF above 7
to 8 in the most recent five years and with 16 days being the highest. The average
maximum current speed is 2.70 m/s yearly which always happens in the flood season
with the highest on record being 3.06 m/s (MOC, 2001). However, current is slow
where close to the banks of the river. The tidal current can only affect up to Nanjing
Port and never reaches Wuhan Port due to the long distance (1125 km) from Wuhan
to the Yangtze River Estuary.

4. Dangerous cargoes and marine pollution
Wuhan Port has special wharves for dealing with dangerous cargoes including
petroleum and chemical products. In 2004, the volume of freight handled for these
cargoes reached 1.87 million tonnes. Meanwhile, many vessels carrying dangerous
cargoes pass through Wuhan Port every year. With the developments in the Chinese
economy, especially the littoral zones of the Yangtze River, the total freight volume
in the Yangtze River ports has risen very rapidly. Figures 31 and 32 illustrate the
change in the distribution of the main cargoes in Yangtze River ports in 1984 and in
2003 (Xinhuanet, 2005). It is shown that in 2003, petroleum and chemical materials
possessed a maximum proportion of the total freight volume instead of coal which
got the largest share in 1984. Undoubtedly, Wuhan Port also has to confront the
increased risks imposed by the sharply growing waterborne dangerous cargo
transport along the Yangtze River.
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Figure 31: Distribution of main cargoes in Yangtze River ports in 1984
Source: Xinhuanet. (2005, January 12). Fast Increase in Freight Volume in Yangtze
River’s Main Ports in the Recent Twenty Years. From the World Wide Web:
http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2005-01/12/content_3555086.htm
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Figure 32: Distribution of main cargoes in Yangtze River ports in 2003
Source: Xinhuanet. (2005, January 12). Fast Increase in Freight Volume in Yangtze
River’s Main Ports in the Recent Twenty Years. From the World Wide Web:
http://www.hb.xinhuanet.com/zhuanti/2005-01/12/content_3555086.htm

Wuhan Port is a river harbour along the Yangtze River, the biggest river in China,
which is regarded as having very high sensitivity in terms of marine environment
pollution. China has promulgated strict laws and regulations to prohibit any
discharge of oil and oily mixtures from ships into the Yangtze River.
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The port is attached to Wuhan City with more than 8 million residents, along the
banks of which there are densely inhabited districts. The River is the main water
source for drinking and industrial production in Wuhan. Many bird species build
their nests on the beaches, while others regularly wander the shoreline searching for
food. Aquatic mammals, such as white-fin dolphins, river suckling pigs and Chinese
sturgeons, live in the River but they are close to extinction. Among them, white-fin
dolphins are called living fossils and their total number is not beyond ten now in the
world. In addition, the River and its shorelines also provide public recreation, such as
fishing activities, swimming, boating, tourism and sightseeing.

5. Local geographical conditions

Wuhan Port is located on the Yangtze River in the province of Hubei, 917 km from
Wusong. The port’s location on the river means there is an extensive network of river
transport links. The average width of channels in Wuhan Port is 570 m, where the
maximum breadth is 1060 m and the minimum is 80 m in the Yangtze River section
while the width of the Hanjiang River is about 60 m and the mouth to the Yangtze
River is around 200 m. There are totally four bridges with 32 abutments in water
crossing the Yangtze River and seven crossing the Hanjiang River in Wuhan port.
The water level in the Yangtze River varies obviously according to the season. The
draft limitation in the main channel is 4.5 m with a clean height of 26 m in the dry
season and 8.0 m with a clean height of 24 m in the flood season.
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